About Kashmiri Names, Surnames and Castes |
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Kashmiris never lose their sense of humour. Even adversity has not killed their instinct of humour. It has on the other hand, sharpened it to boost their morale and love of boisterous life. Hamidullah, a resident of remote meadow village of Nobog Nai, has not only exposed the ruthless Sikh bureaucracy of Kashmir in his Bebujnamah, but has proved himself a caricaturist par excellence as well as a non-conformist as for as Sikh administrative system was concerned. This work contains allegorical names and characters. "It is steeped in symbolism depicting the glaring traits of bureaucracy under Sikh rulers from the Patwari upto the Nazim or Governor. According to the author, the whole lot of them was responsible for all sorts of the sufferings of the peasantry, especially their aim being simply to grease their own palms and to sustain Sikh power by force. The significance of the names he has coined for prominent members of the bureaucracy in the Revenue Department, such as, 'Kazibrathar' for Qanungo; 'Adawat Koul' for Patwari; 'Fasad Bhat' for Harkara, 'Rishwat Baba', for Qazi, can better be guessed than described. Similarly to describe the state of general administration, he introduces characters like 'Gurez Singh' for Mir Shamshere; 'Adbar Singh', for Mir. Bakshi; 'Shahmat Singh' for Chief Police Officer, 'Mafajat Qulli' for Chief Cavalry Officer, 'Rahzan Bandey', for Chamberlian, 'KhalaJat Razdan', for Munsif; 'Tawan Koul', for Amil,' 'Nuqsan Thaplu', for mutasaddi, 'Dewali Dass', for chief storekeeper of grains; and 'Chughl Beg', for news reporter. They are glaring illustrations. The selection of these names as their meanings show, represents the basic characteristics of the holders of the public office. While talking about allegories, we must not forget to mention that Master Caricaturist of ancient Kashmir, Kshemendra, who has in a lyrical language exposed a Kayastha, a prostitute, a Brahmana and many others. His 'Narmala and ' desopdesa ' are available in a printed form.
SURNAMES1. Aram - Some of their ancestor had been employed to collect the taxes from the vegetable growers and in the due course of time the word Aram became their nickname. Rajatarangini has used the word Aramak for them.2. Kral - There are many localities in Kashmir known by the word Kral viz., Kralpur, Kralgund in Kupwara district. In the city of Srinagar we have two Mohallas known as Kral Khud and Kralyar. The Pandits employed for collecting taxes from 'Krals' (potters) were nick named as Kral.3. Gooru - A milk man and a cowherd is called Goor in Kashmiri. Pandits did neither of these jobs However, certain Pandits were employed as Patwaris to keep the accounts of their cattle heads and collect the Government taxes from them. In the course of time their original family names became obscure and were known as Gooru.4. Bakaya - An officer of the rank of a Tehsildar was appointed in the time of Sikhs and Pathans to realise the outstanding taxes from the people. His descendants were nicknamed as Bakaya.5. Manwati - Manwati used to be a standard weight in Kashmir. It was equal to two and a half seers. Government used to levy a tax of one Manwati of rice on the tenants and an official employed to collect this tax was known to people by the name of Manwat. His descendants also lost their original family name and the nickname Manwati became an irremovable attachment to their names.6. Guzarwan - A Guzarwan was an Official-incharge of an excise check-post on the outskirts of a town. Every article coming to the town from outside was to be checked and tax at a previously fixed rate to be realised. A Guzarwan was also to check the smuggling and unauthorised entry of articles to the town. An official employed, thus to perform this duty became famous by the name of Guzarwan. His children, whatever their profession might have been, were also known by this name.7. Bakshi - It is a common Punjabi surname. A Pandit employed as an Assistant to a Punjabi officer, having Bakshi his surname, was also known as Bakshi. Mr. Fauq says a Pandit employed as a clerk of the Army was known as Bakshi or Mir Bakshi.8. Jawansher - Jawansher was a famous Afghan Governor of Kashmir. He had a Pandit as his Peshkar (Assistant) who became famous by the name of his master. Jawansher is the nickname of many families bearing different surnames.9. Munshi - It is a common surname among many linguistic groups of India. K. M. Munshi was a Gujrati and a famous Indologist. Munshis exist in almost all the Hindi-speaking areas of India. Munshi means a clerk. Mr. Fauq says that a certain Pandit of Tikoo family was employed as a Munshi during the rule of Sikhs or Pathans. He was the most intelligent and efficient Munshi Kashmir had ever seen. Therefore, he became famous by his professional name and his children were also known by this name.10. Misri - A Pandit employed in service of a trader who had come from the Egypt (Misr) was known by the nickname Misri. One more probability is that some Pandit had gone to Egypt and when he came back he was known by the name of the country he had visited. Some describe it to be the nickname of those Pandits whose ancestor was employed by a trader dealing in Michari Kandi.11. Turki - A Pandit was employed as a clerk by a Turk trader and was nicknamed as Turki. Fauq mentions Pandit Tab Ram Turki to have been a famous poet who wrote 'Jangnama of Sikhs.' A 'Turki' friend has been re-nicknamed as 'Istambol'. Perhaps, because, Istambole is the capital of Turkey.12. Gandnoo - 'Gandan dasta' is kind of toy and a decoration piece and 'Posha Gandun' is the flower vase. A pandit manufacturing or selling these articles was nicknamed as Gandnoo.13. Kuli - 'Tarkuli Khan' and 'Noor Kulikhan' were two Afghan chiefs during the rule of 'Durani' kings. Pandits employed by them as Government servants were known as Kuli.14. Wazir - The Pandits employed in the service of Wazirs of Kashmir during Pathan and Mughal rule became gradually famous by the name of Wazir.15. Ambardar - Ambar means a huge store. Land revenue was being realised in kind, instead of in cash, in the past. Naturally certain people were employed to look after these stores of levy rice. They were called Ambardar and their later generations also were identified by this name.16. Chakbast - 'Chak' in Kashmiri is the name given to a large piece of land. Chakdari was a common £eature of Kashmir's agrarian system. It was abolished after the end of Dogra regime in 1948. Before the passing of Agrarian laws large pieces of land would be given to influential zamindars as the 'Chaks' on a nominal rent. Therefore, the officers entrusted with the job of keeping a regular- account of these land holdings were known as 'Chakbast.' They were also known as Kanoongo.17. Bhan - It is an ancient Kashmiri nickname given, perhaps, to those who sold the utensils. Bhan is the name of the Sun also but this name does not justify itself to be a source of a nickname or a family name. There is a locality, known as, 'Bana Mohalla', in Srinagar.18. Langar or Langroo - Some of their ancestor must have been the manager of a Government kitchen. His descendants were, therefore, nicknamed Langar or Langroo.19. Fotedar - It is an Arabic and Persian word and was used as a nickname for those Pandits who were entrusted with the duty of looking after the royal treasury, during the rule of Mughal kings.20. Wattal - It is a very derogatory term and is used for a low caste tribe. It is also used for a person who indulges into very mean and lowly acts. It is presumed that some Pandit must have been appointed as an officer of Wattals, who himself was later on known by this very name. Fauq says that during Hindu rule many people swept the premises of temples, without any compensation, out of devotion to the presiding deity of the temple. They and their descendants were later nicknamed as Wattal. One more theory being forwarded is that the Pandits whose family name is Wattal are the descendants of some famous saint by the name of Wattal Nath.21. Hakim - It is the family name of such families whose ancestors have been hereditary Hakims.22. Waza - It literally means a cook. Mr. Fauq is of the view that it was a nickname given to the professional cooks. It may be true of the Muslim Wazas, of whom there is a separate Mohalla by the name of Wazapora in Srinagar. Among Hindus of Kashmir the profession of a Waza is by no means an honourable one. It is adopted only under compelling circumstances, and Waza or a Kandroo (baker) is never addressed by the name of his occupation. But the families known by the name of Waza never feel ashamed of this suffix to their name. It is argued that some of their ancestor was highly fond of good dishes and had gained sufficient knowledge of preparing palatable dishes for himself. He is said to have won the nickname of Waza which continued its company with his descendants, whether or not they had any knowledge of cookery.23. Katwa - Mr. Fauq describes it to be a branch of professional cooks, who earned this nick name for being in habit of using small Patilis (utensils) for cooking.24. Sultan - Their actual family name is 'Koul'. Some of their ancestor was employed as a clerk with the Sultans of Kashmir and became famous by the name of his employers.25. Nala - Mr. Fauq says that there is no family of this name in Srinagar. An ancestor of this family must have been a guard of some Nala (Rivulet). Their gotra is Dattatriya.26. Nehru - It is a nickname which originated from a canal. Probably any ancestor of this family was Mir Munshi of canals (i.e., a supervisor or an overseer of canals). They originally belong to Koul family and are commonly nicknamed as Naroo. A Naroo in Kashmiri means a pipe. It is possible that any of their ancestor was as thin as a pipe and was, therefore, called Naroo, which in due course of time became Nehru. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru in his autobiography sees the genesis of the word Nehru under a different situation. He says, 'we were Kashmiris. Over two hundred years ago, early in the eighteenth century, our ancestor came down from that mountain valley to seek fame and fortune in the rich plains below. Raj Koul was the name of that ancestor of ours and he had gained eminence as a Sanskrit and Persian scholar in Kashmir. He attracted the notice of Emperor Farrukhsair during the latter's visit to Kashmir, and, probably at the Emperor's insistance, the family migrated to Delhi about the year 1716. A Jagir with a house situated on the banks of a canal had been granted to Raj Koul and from the fact of this residence 'Nehru' (from Nahar, a canal) came to be attached to his name; this changed to Kaul Nehru; and in later years, Kaul dropped out, and we became simply Nehrus.' The above statement of Pandit Nehru has been disputed by many on the grounds of historical facts as well as usage of language. Firstly, Farukhsair is never reported to have visited Kashmir. Aurangzeb was the last Mughal King to visit Kashmir. Secondly, Delhi was the home of Urdu language and literature. Naturally the adjectival form of Nahar (canal) would be Nahree and not Nehru. We see many people by the name of Lucknowee, Jullandaree, Ahmadabadi etc., but none with the name of Lucknowoo, Jullandaroo or Ahmadabadoo etc. Kashmir, however, has a tradition of using 'oo' instead of 'ee' viz., Kathjoo, Waloo, Chagtoo, Saproo, Wangoo, Ganjoo, etc. Therefore, it is almost certain that the ancestor of Nehrus who had gone from Kashmir had taken the nickname 'Nehru', from the valley itself, with him. Taking up of residence at a canal bank is only a coincidence.27. Bazaz - Some ancestor of the family must have been a cloth merchant.28. Taimani - It is presumed some Pandit must have been under the service of Taimini Pathans of Kabul and earned this nickname. Fauq believes it to be a word of Hindu or Buddhist origin and considers this family to be the followers of some Rishi or Muni. At the same time, it is suspected that some ancestor of this family might have been of black colour, and was called Tamini as the Tamun in Kashmiri means the carbon formed on the bottom of the utensils.29. Mattu - It is derived from the Sanskrit word Math. Some of the ancestor of this family must have either been a founder or a manager of some Math.30. Darbari - It means a courtier. Some ancestor of the family was a courtier of some Pathan or Sikh Governor's court.31. Bhandari - Some ancestor might have been the in-charge of some Governmental store (Bhandar).32. Akhoon - During the Muslim rule a teacher was called Akhoon. Some elder member of this family was teaching Persian and Arabic to the pupils and was known by the name of his profession rather than by his family name.33. Mirza - Some ancestor was in the service of a Mirza family.34. Hashia - They were professionals engaged in putting margin on papers.35. Nasti - It is nickname of a family whose ancestors sold the snuff. (Naswar).36. Vani - A petty shopkeeper.37. Hak - Growers of Hakh.38. Kotha - It means a granary in Kashmiri. An official-in-charge of the Government granaries was given this nickname.39. Kandhari - Some ancestor of this family was an employee of the traders from Kandhar.40. Diwan - An officer in the Sikh Court.41. Chagtu - An employee of Chagutais.42. Hastwaloo - An employee of the Royal Court in-charge of elephants.43. Durrani - Ahmad Shah on becoming an independent ruler of Afghanistan styled himself as Durri-Durran (pearl of the age). His successors were known as Durrani. In Kashmir this nickname was given to those Pandits who were the employees of Durrani Pathans.44. Bamzai - Employees of Bamzai Pathans.45. Jallali - Clerks employed by Jallali Shias were known as Jallali.46. Chak - Employees of Chak Kings.47. Zradchob - Traders of turmeric (Haldi) or their employees.48. Khaibari - Khaibaris were influential chiefs of Kashmir. Their Pandit employees received this nickname.49. Zalpuri - Employees of traders from Zablistan. It is often mispronounced out of Kashmir as Zalpari.50. Khazanchi - Some ancestor must have been a Cashier.51. Khar - It means an ass in Kashmiri. A Pandit employed to realise taxes from donkey drivers (Markaban).52. Araz Begi - A person employed to read out petitions in the Sikh and Pathan Courts.53. Hazari - A servant of Hazari Pathan's got this nickname.54. Lal - Some ancestor of this family was serving with a Punjabi Lala.55. Karwani - Some elder member must have been selling Kara (i.e., Peanuts).56. Nagari - A Pandit employed as an officer of the royal heralds during Mugal rule got this appellation.57. Aoonth - This nickname was used for a family whose some elder member was employed in Government service, and entrusted with the duty of collecting taxes from camel drivers.58. Kalapoosh - It was a kind of lady's cap used by Pandit as well as Muslim woman to cover their skull over which traditional Tarang or Kasab (traditional headwear of women) would be used. A Pandit selling these Kalpushas or having at anytime used a Kalpush for himself, was nicknamed Kalpush.59. Dral - A name given to those families whose ancestor was working as a broker. It's Hindi equivalent is Dalal and is used as a surname by many families in Hindi-speaking areas of the country.60. Nazir - Fauq states it having been a nickname of a person and his descendants, who was manager of a Government Kitchen. Nazir is also used for a clerk in the court. Pandit Jia Lal Nazir was an efficient teacher and historian.61. Zaraboo - Those Pandits are called Zaraboo whose some ancestor was in-charge of a Government mint.62. Ogra - It means watery rice, just like a Kheer. Fauq states that a Pandit was entrusted with the duty of distributing cooked rice to the hungry during a famine. Once he found the quantity of rice was less and the number of hungry people more. He ordered to get prepared a Wugra, and distributed among the needy. Thus Wugra became a part of his name. It is now written as Ogra.63. Badam - An almond merchant must have been nicknamed as such.64. Tufchi - An ancestor of this family was employed either as an officer of gunners or was himself a gunman during Muslim rule. Tufchi is a corrupted form of Top (a cannon).65. Cheru - A few families of this name reside in Anantnag city. A common ancestor of these families is reported to have been trading into Charkha rods made of apricot wood. An apricot is a succulent orange pink fruit known as Cher in Kashmiri.66. Khachoo - A Khoch in Kashmiri means a special kind of boat used for transporting the goods from one place to another. An ancestor of this family was employed to collect taxes from these special boatmen and was thus nicknamed as Khachoo.67. Mirakhur - Some ancestor of this family was officer of the department entrusted with the duty of maintaining the Royal horses.68. Shora - An ancestor of this family was either a Government officer in-charge of gunpowder makers, or was himself a trader of the explosive material. Shora in Kashmiri means gunpowder.Religious/Official/Academic Epithet
1. Sahib - It is an honorific. Some elderly Pandit who had attained highest stage of spiritual perfection or was well-versed in the religious Scripture was out of reverence called as Sahib. There is a spring of sweet water known as Sahibi Spring near Chashma Shahi Sahib Koul was a great saint from this family.2. Pir - Pir Pandit Padshah, during the reign of Shah Jahan, has been a famous saint of Kashmir. His miracles and spiritual attainments brought many people from different walks of life, under his banner. His desciples were known as Pir.3. Sadhu - Some of the elder member of this family were as faultless and self-realising person as a real Sadhu. So they were known by the name of Sadhu. Another explanation is that some ancestor of this family had proved himself as an honest person under very conspiring and hostile circumstances. He won the public applause and was known as Saidh (the antonym of a thief).4. Sedhu - Some ancestor of this family is reported to have been a Sidha Pursha (attained soul). Another version, of the events leading to this nomenclature, given is that head of this family was a simpleton and was, therefore, nicknamed as Sedhu. A few families of this name live in village Mattan of district Anantnag.5. Sher - Fauq reports an elder of this family musthave killed a lion and was named Sher for his extra-ordinary valour. This guess does not seem to be correct, as is natural, such a brave person would have been called Sah (Kashmiri word for lion) and not a sher. Most probably this name must have originated from the continued association of the head of this family with some Sher Khan or Sher Singh, etc.6. Shair - There must have been a distinguished poet among Kashmiri Pandits, who was better known by the word Shair than his real family name. Naturally the epithet became a part of the names of his progeny.7. Zutshi - It is a corrupt form of the word Jyotshi. Zutshis are reported to have been distinguished astrologers and Sanskrit scholars.8. Razdan - The census report of 1819 states that Razdan is a corrupted form of ancient Sanskrit epithet Rajanak. Stein is of the view that 'the title Rajanak, meaning literaly "a king", used to be given for services rendered to the King. The title has survived in the form of Razdan as a family name of very free occurrence among the Brahmans of Kashmir. It was borne by Rajanaka Ratanakara, the author of the Haravijaya (9th Century), and by many Kashmirian authors of note enumerated in the Vamsaprasasti which Anama Rajanaka (17th Century) has appended to his commentary on the Nisadhacarita. As the designation of certain high officials (Muhammadans), the term Rajanaka is often used by Srivara and in the fourth chron (also in the shortened form Rajana).' R. S. Pandit states that the title Rajanaka was continued under Muhammadan rule and was conferred on Muslim officers.9. Tikoo - It is said to have originated from the 'Trika'. The members of this family were special devotees of the goddess 'Tripura'. Fauq has given one more explanation stating that an ancestor of this family adopted a non-Brahman boy who was deemed to have become a Brahman by a Tika (a sacred mark on the forehead of a Brahman). He and his descendants were later nicknamed as Tiku.10. Dhar - It is stated to be a pure gotra name. Dhar Bharadvaja is the name of their gotra. However, many scholars are of the view that Dhars are the descendants of Damras, the war lords and a troublesome non-Brahmanic tribe of ancient Kashmir.Locality
1. Khan-Mushu - A village towards north-east of Srinagar is known as Khanmoh. Emigrants from this place, became known as Khanmush, in Srinagar.2. Vichari - There is a sacred spring, at the outskirts of Srinagar, near Soura. It is said Lord Shiva had meditated for sometime here. This place is known as Vicharnag. The Pandits coming from this place to Srinagar were nicknamed Vichari.3. Ishbari - Nickname of those Pandits who came to settle down from Ishabari, a village near Nishat garden.4. Kathjoo - Pandit family residing at Kathleshwar in Tanki Pora (a mohalla of Srinagar) was nicknamed Kathjoo.5. Sopori - Pandits of Srinagar, whose ancestors migrated from Sopore, or the descendants of Soya Pandit (founder of Sopore) were known as Sopori. Kashmiri Pandits of this nickname in plains have hanged the word Sopori into Shivpori.6. Thussoo - Emigrants from a village Thus, in Kulgam Tehsil, to the Srinagar city became known by the name of their native village.7. Zadoo - It is said that a certain family residing near a marshy land was called Zadoo (as Zadoo in Kashmiri means a wet and marshy land). They are mispronounced outside Kashmir a as Jadoo (a groom).8. Zaboo - This name is also derived from a marshy and wet land.9. Kakroo - The name to a family who came from a small village Kokargund, near Achhabal. There are a few families of Kakroos in Achhabal also.10. Kar - This name is used for the Pandits who came from a village known as Karhama in Handwara Tehsil. Swami Krishan Joo Kar was an illustrious saint, produced by this family.11. Pampori - Pandits of Pampore, irrespective of their family names, are known by the name of their locality.12. Saproo - Dr. Iqbal, who was the worthy descendant of a Pandit family whose surname was Saproo, wrote to Mr. Fauq about the word Saproo as follows. He wrote that Mr. Dewan Tek Chand M.A., who was a Commissioner in Punjab, had a taste for linguistic research. He told Mr. Iqbal that the word Saproo had its genesis from the Ancient Iranian Kings 'Shapur'. Saproos are those Iranians who had settled down in Kashmir much before the advent of Islam and because of their sharp intellect were absorbed soon with Brahmans of Kashmir. Dr. Iqbal has further written that his father used to say that 'Saproos' are the descendants of those Kashmiri Brahman families who were first to learn Persian and other Islamic studies, during the Muslim rule. Saproo means a person who is first to learn a new thing. This name was given to them out of contempt by other Brahmans. The latter analysis is nearer in the approach of a common Kashmiri and the former assertion needs full investigation.13. Kanzroo - They are the descendants of the Pandits of Kanzar, a village near Tangmarg.14. Momboi - There is no family with this nickname at present. However Mr. Fauq was informed by one Mr. Tarachand Trisal that some contributors to a certain magazine used to write 'Mombai' with their name. It is presumed that some Kashmiri family had temporarily settled at Bombay for sometime and, its members used the epithet Mombay with their names, when they came back. According to another story, a Muslim named Mohammad (Momma) was so gentle that he would not react even to a harsh and abusive language. He became known as Moma Bayoo. It is thought that some Pandit must have been as gentle as Mombayoo and he was along with his descendants nicknamed as such. Yet one more thesis forwarded is that it was a nickname given to those Pandits who came down to Srinagar from Bumai village of Kulgam Tehsil.15. Purbi - Genesis of this term has been discussed in the chapter of "Kashmiri Surnames" in full. Mr. Fauq has quoted an interesting statement of Rai Bahadur Pandit Amar Nath Purbi (ex-Inspector General Customs, Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir), saying that his grandmother after adopting his father, (Pt. Dila Ram) who was serving on a good post with the Nawabs of Lucknow, migrated to Delhi. Delhi people began to call them Purbi as they had come from the eastern part of the country. Mr. Fauq further writes that there were a few families of Bhai Purbi in Srinagar, who according to census report of 1891 were the offspring of a widowed Panditani by a Purbi (coming from the eastern part of the country), whom she secretly re-married. Any person coming from U.P. is still called by the name of 'Bhaia', just as every Kashmiri in plains of Punjab is called as a 'Hato'.16. Madan - Residents of a Mohalla of Srinagar. viz., Madanyar. Madan is a word used for a romantic man. Some of the ancestor might have been of this nature and earned the appellation Madan. Another story forwarded in this connection is that an ancestor of this family was an employee of 'Madan Talkies' owned by a Parsee of Bombay. He and his descendants were, therefore, nicknamed as Madan.17. Haksar - Emigrants from a village named Hakchar in district Baramullah.18. Trisal - A boy of Dhar family was adopted by Pt. Neko Pandit of Trisal. When he came back to settle down in Srinagar he and his descendants were called Trisal (name of a village in Pulwama district).19. Chhachabali - Pandits who took up their residence, during Afghan rule, in the then suburban area of Srinagar viz., Chhatabal, were known as Chhachabali.20. Chakru - Name given to the families having come from Chokur village.21. Krid - Krid in Kashmiri means a thorny creeper. A few families in Shangas Nawgam bear this name. Their ancestors took up residence near a Krid and became known by its name.22. Nad - A family residing near a ravine in the same village is known by the name of Nad. It means a ravine in Kashmiri.23. Baghati - A family having a number of orchards or having taken up their residence in or near an orchard were nicknamed Baghati. Bhag is also a nickname of the same category.23. (a) Hangloo - Pandits of Hangalgund near Kokar Nag.24. Mujoo - It means a raddish in Kashmiri. Ancestors of this family are said to have come from Mujja Gund, a village in district Baramullah.25. Haloo - Emigrants from the village Hal in Pulwama district. Haloo in Kashmiri means a Tidi (grasshopper) also.26. Parmoo - The ancestors of this family must have come from the other side of Pirpanchal range, to settle down in Kashmir valley. Parmoo is a corrupt form of Aparium (i.e., one who lives or has come from the other side). It is, even now, used for any non-Kashmiri person, particularly for a Punjabi. As a matter of fact, Punjabi and Parium have become synonymous terms.27. Nagri - It is different from Nagari. It is an epithet used for the Pandits who had some connection with Nagri Malapora a village in Handwara.28. Ganz - lt is a nickname given to a family which was residing at a place where some bad smell used to come from a stagnant pool of water.29. Danji - One or two families in the village Mattan are having this family name. Danji in Kashmiri means a small ravine and in fact, these families are still residing in a small ravine on the bank of Chaka stream.30. Kilam - Emigrants from the village Kilam of Kulgam Tehsil.31. Booni - A family residing near a big Chinar tree were known by its name.32. Sum - It means a small bridge connecting the two banks of a small rivulet, a pond or a lake. A family residing near such a mini bridge got the appellation 'sum'.33. Rafiz - Shia Muslims, in Kashmir, are called by the name of Rafiz. Some Pandit family for its nearest association with Rafizs or having lived in a locality of Rafizs, got this nickname.34. Bali - A family having lived near a mountain or having some connection with the Bal's (i.e., mountains) was called Bali. It is in no way connected with the Sikh surname Bali.35. Kadal Buju - A nickname of those Buju families which lived near a bridge. Buju nomenclature has been discussed elsewhere.36. Raina - It is stated that the Pandits who originally belonged to Rainawari and later settled down in the main city were known as Raina. Mr. Fauq states that Rainawari was the capital of the famous King Rana Datta 436 A.D.-497 A.D. There was also a large garden of this king situated at the site of present Rainawari and Vari in Kashmiri means a garden. Thus Rainawari meant a garden belonging to the king Ranadatta. Another view expressed is that it, like Razdan, is a corrupted form of the title Rajanaka.Peculiar Circumstance/incident
1. Waloo or Wali - A fire chimney in Kashmiri is called Wol. One who got constructed a fire chimney in his house at first was immediately nicknamed as Wol, which in due course of time became, Waloo and Wali.2. Sas - It means a thick Dal in Kashmiri. It is often cooked along with wopal hakh (a vegetable) and is, thus, known as Saswopalhakh. It is said that some one was irritated to have been served with this (for him unpalatable) dish at a dinner or lunch party. He was asked by some one what dishes were served at the party and instantly came the reply 'Sas' (using half the name to make his anguish more expressive). He and his descendants were later on called 'Sas' by every one.3. Kotru - Some of the elder member of this family had kept a number of pigeons as his pets. He was forever nicknamed as Kotur (Pigeon).4. Wantu/Wanchu - Wantu in Kashmiri is used for a hard walnut. It is impossible to get a full Kernel (GIRI) out of a hard walnut, even if it is broken into pieces. Some of the ancestor of this family must have been a top class miser and was compared to a 'Wont doon' (hard walnut). Thus was this nickname started to continue for generations.5. Mantoo - It means one and a half seer in Kashmiri. It is said that some ancestor of this family underwent a bet to eat a manut (one and a half seer) of rice at a time, which he won. This victory brought its reward in the form of a nickname.6. Wakhul - It is a flat bottomed stone mortar used for shrinking and washing the woollen clothes. In the past the professional washermen were not as abundant as they are now. Therefore, every mohalla had kept at least one Wokhul for the washing purposes. The family in whose premises this Wokhul was kept was in the long-run known by its name. Another explanation forwarded is that the head of this family was in the Government service with a duty to realise taxes from Wakhul makers.6. (a) Kenoo - It is used for a wet and watery thing. It is reported that a certain Pandit of Rainawari who had taken a distasteful dish at some party, was asked by a saint (Mian Shah) about the taste of the dish he had taken. He is reported to have replied that it was as tasteless as a Kinoo. Immediately the Pandit lost his real identity and became known as Kinoo.7. Kallawat - It is said a Pandit by the name of Kailash was working as personal assistant of Colonel Watt, who constructed the Pahalgam Road during the rule of Maharaja Partap Singh. Kalla is the short form of Kailash, and colleagues of the Pandit connected with it the surname of the Colonel and, thus, originated a new name e.g., Kalawat. The descendants of the unfortunate assistant also lost their real family name and were known by the name of Kallawat since then.8. Wangnoo - It stands for a brinjal in Kashmiri. An ancestor of this family is reported to have been highly fond of brinjals and was, therefore, nicknamed after his favourite vegetable. Another explanation given is that Wangnoo is, perhaps, the only vegetable which is cooked with almost all the vegetables. Therefore, a man who could mix with anybody and won over even his foes was nicknamed as Wangnoo; Kashmiri Pandits as a whole were also called as Wangnoo for having successfully mixed up with all the races and religions, without losing their identity. This is perhaps a misnomer for a race who could save its identity only after having submerged its ninety per cent population with other races and religions. A friend sarcastically, but very correctly, remarked that gone are the days when they (Pandits) were called Wangans. Now they are only Wangan Hachi (dried brinjals).9. Labroo - The head of a certain family was for tunate enough to win prefix in any venture he under took. He was nicknamed Labh (profit), which in due course of time became Labroo.10. Taku - An ancestor of this family was fond of taking his meals in a fresh taku (an earthen plate) everytime. He and his descendents were, therefore, known as Taku.11. Safaya - A certain Pandit is reported to have been a lover of cleanliness and was known as Safai, which later on became Safaya.12. Chengaloo - An ancestor of this family is reported to have been of a light heart and would not conceal his happiness and excitement even over small gains. Chengun in Kashmiri means to be jubilient. There are a few families of this nick name in the village Mattan of Anantnag district.13. Jogi - An elder member of their family had become a Jogi.14. Buju - There was an old woman in a Mohalla. She had two or three sons who were called Bujihandi (i.e., Sons of the old woman). This became their permanent nickname and their descendants came to be known as Buju.15. Sukhia - The head of this family is reported to have played the role of a Sakhi (girl friend) in the Krishan Leela drama and was nicknamed as Sakhi, which later on became Sukhia. Another version of facts is given that a parent had named his son Sukh which became later his nickname.16. Peshin - It means the time of afternoon in Kashmiri. A Pandit who was a Government servant had to attend to his job at the afternoon. He was nicknamed Peshin.17. Gamkhwar - A Pandit was a born sympathiser. He would share the sorrow of one and all. Somebody out of envey nicknamed him Gamkhar. Mr. Fauq reports that one Sadanand Koul was given the title of Gamkhar by the Mughal King Shah Jahan. His progeny was also known by this title.18. Bula - One of the ancestors of this family is reported to have been a foolishman. That is why he was called Bula (fool).19. Choor - An ancestor of this family had been caught red-handed while committing a theft, or was a shareholder of the professional thieves. He was labelled as Chsor (thief) for all the time to come.20. Zaroo - A Pandit was a habitual gambler or had allowed gambling den to operate in his house, he was therefore, rightly nicknamed as Zaroo (a gambler). Another explanation given is that a certain Pandit was in habit of taking rash decisions without giving a proper thought to the facts. He was nick named as a Zaroo.21. Chrangoo - It means a handful in Kashmiri. A certain Pandit was known for being a parsimony. He would not give to any begger more than a handful of grain. This led people to call him and his descendants as Chrangoo.22. Musa - After a long and tedious journey or after doing some hard work a man, naturally, relaxes for sometime to refresh himself. This process of refreshing is called 'Muskadun' in Kashmiri. There are two or three families of this name in village Mattan of Anantnag district. They are professional Pandas having their Jajmans (clients) spread all over the Jammu region and the Punjab State. Every year these Pandas go to their clients during winter seasan to collect their annual Dan and Dakshina. It is said that some ancestor of these families would continue to relax and refresh himself for months together, after coming back from a long, tedious and risky journey, over the peaks of Pir Panchal. He was in the long-run nicknamed as Musa and his progeny is known now by this name.23. Brayth - It is a Kashmiri form of the Sanskrit word 'Brasht', which means a deliberate deviation from the religious path. Some of the ancestor of this family must have been found guilty of some non-religious act and was declared Brashta, which became Brayth in the long-run.24. Band - With the curious exception of Akingam (a village in District Anantnag) the Bands are all Muslims. 'The story of Akingam Baghats,' says Mr. Lawrence, is peculiar. Brahmans considered acting to be degrading, and even now the Brahmans of Kashmir the Akingam play as with contempt. But the Brahman plays say that they took to the stage by the express order of goddess Devi. The legend relates that many years ago Devi appeared to the Akingam Pandits, and, placing a fiddle in his hands, said, 'play upon this fiddle'. He protested his inability, but on the goddess persisting, he took up the blow and played unearthly music. He was bidden by Devi to sit under the deodars of the Akingam and play in her honour. For some years he and his sons obeyed the goddess behest but unable to withstand the prejudices of his caste, he finally declined to play any more. On this he was striken with blindness and wondered away to the Lidder Valley. In a dream Devi appeared to the Magistrate of the Lidder, and told him to take old Pandit to Akingam. On reaching Akingam the Pandit recovered his sight and since that day he and his descendants fiddled away without further protest. These Pandits never send their children to school, as they believe that Devi would resent it and would kill their children. This state of things has now completely changed. Bands of Akingam (Mohripora) have left this vocation since long but the name has persisted.25. Gadva - A Pandit was seen always with a Ghadva (a metal tumbler) in his hand going to purchase milk or curd, or even throwing the 'Nirmal' in the river was nicknamed Gadva. Another explanation offered is that a certain Pandit had collected, as a hobby, a large number of different varieties of 'Gadvas' and got this appellation.26. Yachh - It is a corrupt form of the Sanskrit word Yaksha. However, in Kashmir a certain rarely visible animal possessing supernatural powers is now called Yachh. Pandits offer Khichri and other sweetmeats to this animal extra-ordinary on Yaksha Amavasi in December-January, every year. It so happened that a certain Pandit either used to make sounds like a Yachh (i.e., Bas, Bas) or was some how specially linked with the characteristic Yaksha Pooja. He along with his descendants was nicknamed Yachh. The latter assumption seems more true in the light of the fact that this nickname is used mostlv by Gor families.27. Bohgun - It means a cooking vessel made of brass. Some Pandit is stated to have had a hobby of collecting different varieties of Bahgun, or was fond of the food prepared in a certain type of Bohgun, and was nicknamed as such, because in appearance he was as fat and round as a 'Bohgun'. Another explanation given is that it is a corrupt form of the Sanskrit word Bahuguna (possessor of many qualities).28. Nakab - It means a veil. Kashmiri Pandit ladies did not wear a veil in the past. But a family having introduced this practice at first, during Muslim rule, got this nickname.29. Thalchoor - It means a plate thief. A Pandit was either caught red handed while stealing thals (plates) or was accused of such a theft. He and his descendants got the appellation of Thalchoor.30. Kakh - An elder brother, uncle or a cousin was out of reverence called as Kakh. Some Pandit for his good and generous nature seems to have won the public respect and was called Kakh by the people, other than his family members. He lost his real appellation and was along with his progeny known as Kak. However, there are repeated references of the family name Kak in Rajtarangini. Shaloka 1311 of Taranga VII reads, 'As his passage was blocked by warriors of the Kaka and other educated families, he retreated from. . .' R. S. Pandit in a footnote to above Shaloka says that the Kaka family is repeatedly referred to by Kalhana. Shaloka 180 and 599 of Taranga VIII says, 'holders of high military rank and others, brave men such as Tilka of the family of Kaka. . .'. 'From the very midst of ..., Sufi captured alive in battle the brave knight Sobhka sprung from the family of Kaka...' Kaks in the ancient Kashmir, therefore, belonged to a military class.31. Chilam - Some ancestor of this family was a chilam smoker and got this name.32. Thapal - A few families of this name live in Anantnag city. Some of the common ancestor of these families must have been a habitual snatcher and got this nickname.33. Kuchur - It means penis in Kashmiri. An ancestor of the family is reported to have been moving without trousers or a Kacha and thus unmindful of his exposed penis. He was along with his progeny nicknamed as Kuchur.34. Jad - It means the eldest ancestor in Kashmiri. An elder member of this family is reported to have been behaving like an old and experienced man even during his childhood. He was therefore, nicknamed as Jad.35. Jalla - A family of Rainawari Pandits was residing on the bank of Dal Lake (now turned into a quagmire). This part of the lake abounded in delicious fish. The fishermen catching the fish, would generally spread their nets on the compound wall of this family, to dry them up. A fish net in Kashmiri is called a Zal. This family was, therefore, nicknamed as Zalu, which in the long run became Jala.36. Puran - A few families of this nickname live in village Zainapora. One of their common ancestor is reported to have been in habit of quoting from the Puranas on every occasion. He was, therefore, known as Puran.37. Zaharbad - An ancestor of this family is reported to have been suffering from a serious type of Carbuncle on an exposed part of his body. He was, therefore, nicknamed as Zaharbad. Another reason related is that some ancestor of this family was a terrible mischief monger and was intolerably unpleasant man. The people expressed their displeasure for his mischievous character by an equally unpleasant nickname (i.e., Zaharbad).Abnormal/Extra-ordinary Physique or Temperament
1. Mushran - An awkward and ugly man with a huge and powerful body is called Mushran. Some ancestor of this family must have been nicknamed as mushran because of his unusual physique and, later his descendants continued to be called by this name.2. Kuraz - It is a name given to a very dangerous water animal. Some elder member of this family must have been of a fierce nature and was nicknamed Kuraz.3. Shagali - Shagalis had come along with Pathans, under the leadership of Gulshagali. He was a long and healthy young man. A pandit was having an extraordinary physique like Gulshagali and was accordingly nicknamed.4. Sharga - It is corrupt form of Shogo (a parrot). Some member of the family was having small eyes and a long nose like a parrot.5. Handoo - This nickname was given to a Pandit who was fat and fresh like a sheep or to those Pandits who somehow were connected with flocks of sheep.6. Atal - It is a corrupt form of Thalal (i.e., a Samashar). A Pandit with a broad forehead as if a forceful smasher, received this nickname.7. Gurtu - It is a nickname given, perhaps, to those Razdans whose some ancestor was of Gurtu (yellow) colour. Gurtu is now used for those Pandits who do not cook meat and fish on the Shivratri festival.8. Shangloo - Some elder member of this family is reported to have had six fingers in his hand and became known as six-fingered (She Angul).9. Mota - A fat man's nickname.10. Langoo - Some elder of the family was a lame man.11. Kaboo - Any ancestor of this family is reported to have been a hunch backed (Kaboo) man.12. Marchawangan - A thin and a red faced man may have been nicknamed as a red pepper. It is also possible that some ancestor of the family was in possession of a hot and pungent temperament, ormay be some one of the family elders was a pepper trader.13. Raghu - A thin and a frail man must have won the appellation.14. Kachroo - Some ancestor must have been as red haired as an Englishman.15. Kichloo - It means a long-beared in Kashmiri Some elder of the family must have developed a long beard and received this nickname.16. Chakoo - Chouk means 'bottom' as well as 'sour' in Kashmiri. It is reported that some elder of the family was a sour-tempered man. Mr. Fauq connects it with an amusing and interesting story. A man named his twelfth son as Chauk (i.e., bottom) of the chain of sons and he (the son) became famous by the name of Chauk. It is amusingly and often awkwardly mispronounced as Chakoo (a Knife) outside Kashmir.17. Khashoo - A left hander.18. Ganjoo - A bald man's nickname or an appellation for a man who was put in-charge of Ganj (treasury).19. Gagroo - It was the nickname of a person who was very small and swift.20. Kharoo - A bald man.21. Zoroo - A deaf man.22. Kariholu - A nickname given to an elder of the family, whose neck was a little curved.23. Kaw - An ancestor af this family was as black as a crow.24. Daraz - A long-heighted ancestor of the family was given this name.25. Mam - It means maternal uncle in Kashmiri. A man was in habit of poking his nose in everybody's affairs. He and his children were, therefore, nicknamed as Mam.26. Chacha - The word Chacha is used by Kashmiri Muslims for a paternal uncle. A Pandit who unnecessarily involved himself in other peoples' affairs must have received this nickname.27. Tut - A man with a long chin was nicknamed Tut.28. Bambroo - An ancestor of this family was as dark complexioned as a black bee. It is also said that some elder member of this family was in habit of making sounds like a beetle when alone. That is why he and his descendants came to be known as Bambroo.29. Kalla - It means head in Kashmiri. An ancestor of this family had a conspicuous head and was named as Kalla.30. Sikh - It is said that an ancestor of this family had grown a long beard to conceal the white patches on his face. He and his family members were nicknamed as Sikh.31. Hakhoo - It was used as a nickname for a thin and frail person. His descendants were also labelled as Hakhoo, even if some one among them may be as fat as an elephant.32. Trakroo - This nickname was given to a man who was of very hot temperament and, of course, a hard task master. The nickname became part and parcel of his descendants also. Trakur in Kashmiri is used for anything hard.33. Miskeen - A man was very kind to poor and needy. He was nicknamed as Miskeen (poor). Another explanation is that a well-to-do man used to feign as a poor man. He was along with his progeny called as Miskeen.34. Chhot - It means a short statured person. Some elder of the family was unusually of a short stature and won this nickname for himself and his descendants.35. Braroo - An ancestor of this family must have been a blue eyed man and was nicknamed as Braroo (the cat).36. Kaloo - It means a person unable to speak. The name is Kaloo (just like a dumb-man).37. Nikka - It is an 'affectionate name' given to small boys in Kashmiri families. Such a name generally gets discarded as soon as the boy grows up to be a youth. However, some Pandit seems to have been called Nikka, even after he attained his adulthood, and thus got the nickname. Another reason could be that an ancestor of this family was a short and small statured that even in his youth and old age, he looked like a boy and was called a Nikka.38. Kissu - It means a small finger. Some ancestor of the family is reported to have been in possession of an extra-ordinary Kis, or was in habit of displaying his small finger in a peculiar way and got the appellation.39. Mandal - In Kashmiri mandal means buttocks. An ancestor of the family is reported to have been a large rumped person and, thus, got this nickname.40. Dev - Some Pandit seems to have been nicknamed as such, either for his extra-ordinary valour or having the habit of taking too much food or sleep - the peculiarities of a Dev. A Dev is an imaginary being like a Jinnie of Arabian nights.41. Dasi - A few families of this name live in Anantnag town. An ancestor of this family is reported to have been a spend thrift and would become bankrupt in every trade and occupation he owned. He was thus nicknamed as Dasi, meaning a person who would finish and destroy everything.42. Vokhu - An ancestor of this family is reported to have been of abnormal physiqueas well as temperament.43. Pedar - An ancestor of this family is reported to have a deformed foot which looked like a cloven hoof and was thus nicknamed as Padar.
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Afghan Réconciliation Plan: India’s Policy Options
Afghan Réconciliation Plan: India’s Policy Options
Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (Retd)
E-Mail-rkbhonsle@gmail.com
Domestic politics frequently dictates war aims. This is particularly so when the front line is as far off as Afghanistan is from the United States and Europe and the enemy as elusive as the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This axiom played out in the London international conference on Afghanistan on 28 January where amongst a number of important decisions the one on reconciliation with the “good” Taliban will remain one of the most controversial.
India which suffered the fallout of the Taliban rule during their brief control of Kabul from 1996 to 2001- when the country had become a base for training and arming militants for Jammu & Kashmir - as a responsible regional player has decided to go along with the international community though the IC 814 hijack to Kandahar remains fresh in public memory.
The National Peace and Reintegration Programme as proposed in the London Conference will be initiated through a Grand Peace Jirga before the Kabul Conference later during the year to bring Taliban leaders and soldiers willing to join the government on board. A Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to finance the Afghan-led Peace and Reintegration Programme has also been formed. An initial commitment of $140 million has been made which is expected to go up to $500 million.
There were sufficient indications that a plan for reconciliation with the Taliban was being made. There have been possibly a number of meetings with the Taliban and the level of penetration of the organisation and the leadership is not very clear at present. In consonance with this strategy, the Security Council's al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee approved de-listing of the names of Mutawakil, Faiz Mohammad Faizan, Maulvi Abdul Hakim Monib, Shamsus Safa Aminzai and Muhammad Musa Hotak, all senior government functionaries during the Taliban regime. The reaction of the Taliban Shura to the proposal has been ambivalent even as report of a meeting with the UN Chief Kai Eide was denied thus, "The Leadership Council considers this mere futile and baseless rumours, being a machination against jihad and the Mujahideen."
Special advisor to President Hamid Karzai, Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta and a former Foreign Minister gave an impression that the scheme to reintegrate moderate Taliban into the national mainstream was not aimed at sharing power with the insurgents. If that be so why the top Taliban leadership should join the government remains a moot question. The main problem would remain therefore the leadership who will not be satisfied with ministerial or other portfolios which do not match their current or past stature. This is the problem being faced by Hamid Karzai even today when he has to juggle posts with leaders such as the Uzbek chief, Dostum to keep them on the right side of the government.
Thus the plan may well succeed in getting a number of foot soldiers and minor leaders over, but their integration may be extremely challenging and an institutional mechanism for the same would have to be established. The “$25 a day Taliban” – as they are being called in some quarters would keep their options open to switch sides unless there is an effective plan to integrate them into civil society.
Peace and reconciliation is a good strategy when a militant force is defeated and is on the retreat, but will be difficult to implement when there are no signs of the Taliban having lost their capability to launch attacks at will. Under the circumstances it would seem to be an abject surrender. What is also relevant is collection of funds for buying out the Taliban. Such a policy is likely to discredit the peace parleys and reconciliation when ever held. So there are dangerous days ahead.
On examination of all facets it is evident that talks with the Taliban or those who have left their ilk and want to play a larger role in national reconstruction have been taking place at multiple levels. Firstly the meeting said to be have been held between UNAMA chief Kai Eide and some Taliban representatives has been denied by both sides. What ever be the truth, some negotiations with UN representatives may have taken place which has led to the five former members of the Taliban cabinet being delisted from UN sanctions.
At the second level a meeting between the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction of the Taliban and representatives of the government including some MPs has reportedly taken place in Maldives, and may lead to a rapprochement between the Hekmatyar faction and the Karzai government.
At a third level there is engagement between the Afghan government and splinter groups who masquerade as the Taliban but who are reasonably autonomous led by prominent tribal chiefs or criminal groups. This reconciliation will happen through the tribal jirga being held before the Kabul Conference.
At a fourth level it is not clear if any negotiations are on with hard core Taliban – either the Quetta shura or the Haqqani faction – which will invariably happen through the Pakistani ISI as these groups are beholden to it. These negotiations if any will be calibrated by the Establishment in Rawalpindi for they remain its, “strategic assets”.
Past experience of such reconciliation and peace deals in the Af-Pak region particularly with the Pakistani Taliban of North and South Waziristan show that these have simply ended up with both sides taking a breather from fighting, gaining time to recoup and resume their ideological as well as armed struggle. Therefore the reintegration plan may be used by the Taliban to see exit of the ISAF/NATO and then proceed with the plan to establish the so called Islamic Caliphate in the country.
Thus a scenario of the Taliban using this opportunity to see tapering down of the NATO presence in Afghanistan to restart their campaign of violence would have to be guarded against. This is the ‘honey-trap’ that Western governments may well fall for.
India can supplement its current contribution by providing expertise and experience in the integration council being created by the Afghan government though this would be vehemently opposed by Pakistan, our experience in successfully concluding such negotiations in the North East and integrating a large number of militants in the main stream would be invaluable in Kabul.
On the whole a major review of India’s Afghan policy may be on the cards factoring in a reconciled Taliban for which it would have to reactivate its Pashtun linkages, one of whom remains the Afghan President himself.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (Retd)
E-Mail-rkbhonsle@gmail.com
Domestic politics frequently dictates war aims. This is particularly so when the front line is as far off as Afghanistan is from the United States and Europe and the enemy as elusive as the Al Qaeda and the Taliban. This axiom played out in the London international conference on Afghanistan on 28 January where amongst a number of important decisions the one on reconciliation with the “good” Taliban will remain one of the most controversial.
India which suffered the fallout of the Taliban rule during their brief control of Kabul from 1996 to 2001- when the country had become a base for training and arming militants for Jammu & Kashmir - as a responsible regional player has decided to go along with the international community though the IC 814 hijack to Kandahar remains fresh in public memory.
The National Peace and Reintegration Programme as proposed in the London Conference will be initiated through a Grand Peace Jirga before the Kabul Conference later during the year to bring Taliban leaders and soldiers willing to join the government on board. A Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund to finance the Afghan-led Peace and Reintegration Programme has also been formed. An initial commitment of $140 million has been made which is expected to go up to $500 million.
There were sufficient indications that a plan for reconciliation with the Taliban was being made. There have been possibly a number of meetings with the Taliban and the level of penetration of the organisation and the leadership is not very clear at present. In consonance with this strategy, the Security Council's al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee approved de-listing of the names of Mutawakil, Faiz Mohammad Faizan, Maulvi Abdul Hakim Monib, Shamsus Safa Aminzai and Muhammad Musa Hotak, all senior government functionaries during the Taliban regime. The reaction of the Taliban Shura to the proposal has been ambivalent even as report of a meeting with the UN Chief Kai Eide was denied thus, "The Leadership Council considers this mere futile and baseless rumours, being a machination against jihad and the Mujahideen."
Special advisor to President Hamid Karzai, Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta and a former Foreign Minister gave an impression that the scheme to reintegrate moderate Taliban into the national mainstream was not aimed at sharing power with the insurgents. If that be so why the top Taliban leadership should join the government remains a moot question. The main problem would remain therefore the leadership who will not be satisfied with ministerial or other portfolios which do not match their current or past stature. This is the problem being faced by Hamid Karzai even today when he has to juggle posts with leaders such as the Uzbek chief, Dostum to keep them on the right side of the government.
Thus the plan may well succeed in getting a number of foot soldiers and minor leaders over, but their integration may be extremely challenging and an institutional mechanism for the same would have to be established. The “$25 a day Taliban” – as they are being called in some quarters would keep their options open to switch sides unless there is an effective plan to integrate them into civil society.
Peace and reconciliation is a good strategy when a militant force is defeated and is on the retreat, but will be difficult to implement when there are no signs of the Taliban having lost their capability to launch attacks at will. Under the circumstances it would seem to be an abject surrender. What is also relevant is collection of funds for buying out the Taliban. Such a policy is likely to discredit the peace parleys and reconciliation when ever held. So there are dangerous days ahead.
On examination of all facets it is evident that talks with the Taliban or those who have left their ilk and want to play a larger role in national reconstruction have been taking place at multiple levels. Firstly the meeting said to be have been held between UNAMA chief Kai Eide and some Taliban representatives has been denied by both sides. What ever be the truth, some negotiations with UN representatives may have taken place which has led to the five former members of the Taliban cabinet being delisted from UN sanctions.
At the second level a meeting between the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar faction of the Taliban and representatives of the government including some MPs has reportedly taken place in Maldives, and may lead to a rapprochement between the Hekmatyar faction and the Karzai government.
At a third level there is engagement between the Afghan government and splinter groups who masquerade as the Taliban but who are reasonably autonomous led by prominent tribal chiefs or criminal groups. This reconciliation will happen through the tribal jirga being held before the Kabul Conference.
At a fourth level it is not clear if any negotiations are on with hard core Taliban – either the Quetta shura or the Haqqani faction – which will invariably happen through the Pakistani ISI as these groups are beholden to it. These negotiations if any will be calibrated by the Establishment in Rawalpindi for they remain its, “strategic assets”.
Past experience of such reconciliation and peace deals in the Af-Pak region particularly with the Pakistani Taliban of North and South Waziristan show that these have simply ended up with both sides taking a breather from fighting, gaining time to recoup and resume their ideological as well as armed struggle. Therefore the reintegration plan may be used by the Taliban to see exit of the ISAF/NATO and then proceed with the plan to establish the so called Islamic Caliphate in the country.
Thus a scenario of the Taliban using this opportunity to see tapering down of the NATO presence in Afghanistan to restart their campaign of violence would have to be guarded against. This is the ‘honey-trap’ that Western governments may well fall for.
India can supplement its current contribution by providing expertise and experience in the integration council being created by the Afghan government though this would be vehemently opposed by Pakistan, our experience in successfully concluding such negotiations in the North East and integrating a large number of militants in the main stream would be invaluable in Kabul.
On the whole a major review of India’s Afghan policy may be on the cards factoring in a reconciled Taliban for which it would have to reactivate its Pashtun linkages, one of whom remains the Afghan President himself.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
Pakistan's Concept of Strategic Depth
Pakistan's Concept of Strategic Depth
Centre for Land Warfare Studies
E-Mail-landwarfare@gmail.com
Special Issue Brief
Team CLAWS
Recently, a number of commentators have reflected on Pakistan’s concept of strategic depth. Here we present a selection of relevant articles, as also some material for further reading.
Strategic Depth
Lt Gen Asad Durrani (Retd)
CLAWS Article No. 1487
06 February 2010
Strategic Depth is a sound concept. All countries strive to gain and retain it. It is not merely a geographical or spatial notion, but has many dimensions: military, economic, demographic, social and political; and indeed internal and external.
Russia is a quintessential case of a country endowed with wide spaces that were used strategically in its war against Napoleon and in the Second World War. During the bipolar era, its East European satellites and Central Asian republics provided it with additional depth, externally. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained interested in its “near abroad”. That illustrates the significance of this factor.
Israel, because of its very different environment, has taken another path to achieve the same effects. Critically lacking physical depth internally, it has primarily relied upon military power and American support to overcome this handicap, and gain territory externally. But its strategic depth essentially lies thousands of kilometers away, in the US.
Objectives of this concept are indeed best served by a country’s inherent internal strength. All the same, alliances with other countries are helpful and at times unavoidable.
Afghanistan was once assigned the role of a “buffer” between the Soviet and the British Empires; to create strategic depth for both of them. When the latter left the Region and India was partitioned, Afghanistan continued to provide (forward) strategic depth to Pakistan, the successor state in the West, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Pakistan lost it when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviets. Its help to the Afghan resistance was aimed at restoring the status quo anti.
Indeed, it also had an Indian context. With the Soviets now on its Western borders and India in the East, Pakistan was- what at that time was called- in a “nutcracker situation”. Considering that the pre-invasion Afghanistan had never exploited its periods of wars with India, Pakistan was all the more desperate to get the Soviet occupation vacated.
There has been plenty of criticism of Pakistan’s policy of helping the Afghan resistance. Some may do so because, according to them, it spread drugs, weapons and militancy in the region. Others opposed to Zia-ul-Haq were loath to support a policy that carried his name (and must have been very depressed when with the Soviet withdrawal it achieved its primary objective). They have every right to run down the policy, but to malign in the process a valid doctrine is a bit devious.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=488&u_id=101
Defining "Strategic Depth"
Kamran Shafi
Dawn
19 January 2010
Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan to disengage itself from the fighting, if India goes to war with Pakistan? And how does it help us? We are engaged in the Great Game in Afghanistan, we are told, because ‘strategic depth’ is vital for Pakistan due to the fact that our country is very narrow at its middle and could well be cut into half by an Indian attack in force.
Strategic depth, we are further informed, will give respite to our armed forces which could withdraw into Afghanistan to then regroup and mount counter-attacks on Indian forces in Pakistan. I ask you!
I ask you for several reasons. Let us presume that the Indians are foolish enough to get distracted from educating their people, some of whom go to some of the best centres of learning in the world. Let us assume that they are idiotic enough to opt for war instead of industrialising themselves and meeting their economic growth targets which are among the highest in the world.
Let us imagine that they are cretinous enough to go to war with a nuclear-armed Pakistan and effectively put an immediate and complete end to their multi-million dollar tourism industry. Let us suppose that they lose all sense, all reason, and actually attack Pakistan and cut our country into half.
Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass, and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes?
And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? Far more than anything else, what about the by now 180 million people of the country? What ‘strategic depth’ do our Rommels and Guderians talk about, please? What poppycock is this?
More importantly, how can Afghanistan be our ‘strategic depth’ when most Afghans hate our guts, not only the northerners, but even those who call themselves Pakhtuns?
Case in point: the absolute and repeated refusal of even the Taliban government when it was misruling Afghanistan, to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite the fact that it was a surrogate of Pakistan — propped into power; paid for; and helped militarily, diplomatically and politically by the Pakistani government and its ‘agencies’.
Indeed, it even refused the Commando’s interior minister, the loudmouth Gen Moinuddin Haider when he went to Kabul to ask for the extradition of Pakistani criminals being sheltered by the Taliban. We must remember that the Commando, as chief executive of the country, was pressing the Foreign Office till just a few days before 9/11 to use every effort to have the Taliban regime’ recognised by more countries!
This poppycock of ‘strategic depth’ can only be explained by our great military thinkers and strategists and geniuses: it is not for mortals like yours truly to make sense of any of it. Particularly because this nonsense can only happen after the Americans depart from Afghanistan. And what, pray, is the guarantee that they will leave when they say they will?
Why this subject at this time, you might well ask. Well I have just been reading David Sanger’s The Inheritance in which he meticulously lays out the reasons why he believes the Pakistani “dual policy” towards the Taliban exists.
On page 247 he states that when Michael McConnell, the then chief of US National Intelligence went to Pakistan in late May 2008 (three months after the elections that trounced Musharraf and his King’s Party, mark) he heard Pakistani officers make the case for the Pakistani need for having a friendly government in Kabul after the Americans departed.
When he got back to Washington McConnell “ordered up a full assessment” of the situation. ‘It did not take long … Musharraf’s record of duplicity was well known. While Kayani was a favourite of the White House, he had also been overheard — presumably on telephone intercepts — referring to one of the most brutal of the Taliban leaders, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, as a “strategic asset”. Interesting, for Kayani’s former boss, Musharraf is quoted thus in Der Spiegel:
Spiegel: “Let us talk about the role of the ISI. A short time ago, US newspapers reported that ISI has systematically supported Taliban groups. Is that true?”
Musharraf: “Intelligence always has access to other networks — this is what Americans did with KGB, this is what ISI also does. You should understand that the army is on board to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. I have always been against the Taliban. Don’t try to lecture us about how we should handle this tactically. I will give you an example: Siraj Haqqani ...”
Spiegel: “... a powerful Taliban commander who is allegedly secretly allied with the ISI.”
Musharraf: “He is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a dangerous terrorist, the fiercest commander in South Waziristan and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know today. Mehsud kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used Haqqani’s influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean that Haqqani is supported by us. The intelligence service is using certain enemies against other enemies. And it is better to tackle them one by one than making them all enemies.”
Well, there they go again!
But back to ‘strategic depth’. Will the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, help Pakistan gain this ‘depth’ in Afghanistan? Are we that gone that we need these backward yahoos to save our army?
PS By the way what about our nuclear weapons? Are they not enough to stop the Indians in their tracks? What poppycock is this ‘strategic depth’?!
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/14-defining-strategic-depth-910
Analysis: Zaid Hamid and strategic depth
Farhat Taj
Daily Times
13 February 2010
What are we first of all: Muslim or Pakistani? Is our ultimate commitment with Pakistani citizenship or a global Muslim brotherhood? What kind of Pakistan should we aim at: a progressive multi-ethnic social democracy or some kind of medieval caliphate?
FATA continues to be used and abused as a strategic space by the security establishment of Pakistan in violent pursuit of strategic depth in Afghanistan. In short, strategic depth means Pakistan must have a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan by any and all means. People of FATA have suffered more than people in any other part of Pakistan due to this policy. They dread and hate ‘strategic depth’.
Some people of FATA drew my attention towards Zaid Hamid, who, they said, is a new charm offensive of the military establishment to popularise the notion of strategic depth among the youth from affluent families in the big cities of Pakistan. He is frequently given air time by the electronic media, also an evidence that the media, especially the Urdu media, is not free and has to toe the establishment’s line in security matters. Show biz celebrities have joined him. Those who oppose the strategic depth, especially the Pakhtun, who are the biggest casualty of it, are never given so much media attention.
The main concern of the people of FATA vis-a-vis Zaid Hamid is his use of a particularly narrow interpretation of Islam that proposes a belligerent agenda for the Pakistan Army and drawing on controversial Islamic literature. Thus the authenticity of the hadiths — sayings of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) — on Ghazwa-e-Hind that he often refers to in terms of the ultimate defeat of the Indians at the hands of the Pakistan Army is highly questionable.
Zaid Hamid claims in his speeches to young people that God determines the destiny of Pakistan. Pakistan will become a grand Caliphate. Pakistan army will cut India down to the size of Sri Lanka. Pakistan will lead the entire Muslim world and its army will be deployed in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and Afghanistan. The corrupt judicial system, consisting of the lawyers and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, will be replaced by an Islamic judicial system that would ensure — Taliban style — speedy and cheap justice. He claims that the current elected set up in Pakistan is implanted by the CIA and prophesies that the current rulers in Pakistan will have their dead bodies hanging on poles in Islamabad, an indirect appreciation of what the Taliban did in Afghanistan with the dead body of Dr Najibullah, the then Afghan president. He openly threatens the nationalists, especially the Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists, for their aspirations. The Taliban government in Afghanistan, he declares, was Pakistan-friendly and condemns its removal by the US in the post-9/11 attack on the country. He glorifies the biggest mass murderer of the Pakhtun — General Zia, the former dictator of Pakistan.
Judging by the obscurantist message that he communicates, Zaid Hamid does not seem to be a new invention of the establishment. He is an addition to the long list of people who have been handpicked to promote an anti-people agenda in the name of religion and hate of India, like the people from the Jamaat-e-Islami. What seems to be new is his apparent ‘tolerance’ of the ‘un-Islamic’ lifestyle of the urban youth and in this context there are some interesting discussions about Zaid Hamid on some blogs and mailing lists. One blogger writes that Zaid Hamid is using a new strategy to communicate the same old conspiracy theories to young people. The strategy is that unlike classical Islamic scholars, joining Zaid Hamid’s group does not necessarily require the youth to shed their sophisticated lifestyle and adjust to hijab, a ban on music and gender segregation. The only thing they have to do is to glorify the Pakistan Army, including its pursuit of strategic depth, and hate Jews, Americans and Indians.
A writer on one of the mailing lists argues that Zaid Hamid is a Pied Piper for our youth from the prosperous sections of Punjab who have no dreams to be proud of. Zaid Hamid sells the dreams of conquering the world, though they are nonsense, yet still work for the youth who are now caught up in an identity crisis, continues the writer. The writer understands that the fault lies with the leftist intellectuals who have lost direction by joining NGOs and leaving the anti-imperialist struggle open for people like Zaid Hamid or Imran Khan.
Zaid Hamid, in his show, sets a dangerous agenda for the youth of Pakistan; the very same youth who are living a comfortable life in poverty-stricken Pakistan. They lack any ambitions in life to give it some purpose. This lack of goals is rooted in the identity crisis being faced by the Pakistani youth. The crisis is expressed in questions like these: what are we first of all: Muslim or Pakistani? Is our ultimate commitment with Pakistani citizenship or a global Muslim brotherhood? What kind of Pakistan should we aim at: a progressive multi-ethnic social democracy or some kind of medieval caliphate?
Secondly, one has to strive very hard for ideals. If the ideal is the former (multi-ethnic social democratic Pakistan), the youth from affluent families will have to share their riches with the poor, downtrodden fellow citizens. This is very hard for this class of people, otherwise I would at least have seen them working for bringing normalcy in the shattered lives of the people of FATA, who have been living in deplorable conditions in refugee camps for over two years now. In the latter case (caliphate) they can placate their conscience by attaching themselves with the higher ideal without having to give up something from their comfortable lives. The only thing they have to do is to support the belligerent agenda of the military establishment and their poor fellow Pakistanis can go to hell. Zaid Hamid’s campaign is like opium for the young that makes them run away from reality, i.e. Pakistan is a class-based multi-ethnic society that cannot be held together with mere Islamic rhetoric and military ambitions.
What is even more dangerous is the fact that Zaid Hamid is glorifying the same Taliban that the people of FATA hold responsible for their massacre at the behest of the military establishment of Pakistan. Case in point, Jalaluddin Haqqani who occupies North Waziristan. I would invite the young fans of Zaid Hamid to take a tour of FATA, or at least FATA IDP camps in various parts of the NWFP, to observe firsthand what the Taliban and the military did to these people. I would remind the youth that people all over FATA hold the generals of the Pakistan Army more than the Taliban responsible for the death and destruction in their area. They view the Taliban — all Taliban, good, bad, Afghan or Pakistani — as a creation of the intelligence agencies of our country. How much more do the people of FATA need to sacrifice for strategic depth in Afghanistan? The never-ending human sufferings in the area could transform into widespread anti-state sentiments. The youth around Zaid Hamid must know that the current pursuit of strategic depth may turn into — as rightly described in this paper’s editorial ‘Strategic death’? (Daily Times, February 3, 2010) –’strategic death’ for Pakistan rather than securing a friendly Afghanistan.
The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. She can be reached at bergen34@yahoo.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\13\story_13-2-2010_pg3_4
The Fallacy of the Last Move in Pakistan
Michael Krepon
The Khaleej Times
30 January 2010
This would be a good time for Pakistan and India to negotiate new nuclear risk reduction measures, as both countries may well be in the lull between crises sparked by extremists with links to Pakistan. But one of the many paradoxes related to nuclear weapons is that when reductions in nuclear dangers are most needed, they can be hardest to implement. New Delhi is still smarting from the last mass casualty attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 that killed almost 170 innocent bystanders. The attackers were trained and equipped in Pakistan. They were affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that was ostensibly banned by General Pervez Musharraf, but which still enjoys considerable autonomy.
Islamabad sensibly calls for a resumption of official dialogue with India. New Delhi sensibly argues that Pakistan must do more to fulfill oft-repeated pledges that its soil not be used as the springboard for cross-border terrorism. Some of those who helped the Mumbai attackers are now on trial in Pakistan. The outcome of this trial will help determine when official bilateral talks might resume. But it is already crystal clear that the most important nuclear risk reduction measure on the subcontinent would be more concerted efforts by the security apparatus in Pakistan to clamp down on extremist groups that use that country as a base.
Pakistan is now caught on the horns of a dilemma: the "assets" it supported to place pressure on India have now become liabilities. Pakistanis blames others for this dilemma, most notably the United States, which also supported Islamic militancy when it served the purpose of removing the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The United States unwisely walked away from both Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Soviet exit, while Pakistan's security apparatus unwisely decided to redirect jihadi tactics against India.
Had Washington remained in Afghanistan after 1989, Pakistan would in all probability still have employed surrogates to control that ill-fated land, as has been evident by its support for the Afghan Taliban after the U.S. returned to oust Mullah Omar and al Qaida. But in cutting off ties to the Pakistan military with the imposition of the Pressler Amendment - triggered not by the Soviet departure, but by Pakistani uranium enrichment activities during the 1990 crisis with India - Washington lost for a decade whatever influence it might have had on Pakistan-Indian relations. During this time, jihadi groups dined at the ISI's table, and caused considerable grief in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
It did not take a great gift of prophesy to predict that Pakistan's tactics would eventually backfire. Using violence to draw international attention to the "nuclear flashpoint" of Kashmir initially served Pakistan's interests. But the more its security apparatus played with fire, the more Pakistan's domestic and economic fortunes declined. One decisive turning point came with the 1999 Kargil War, which stripped away the last vestiges of plausible deniability regarding Pakistan's use of surrogates to leverage the Kashmir dispute. No single development did more to solidify international support for the status quo along the Kashmir divide than the Kargil misadventure. Another decisive pivot came after 9/11, when General Musharraf had little choice but to sever ties with an Afghan government hosting al Qaida and to join the Bush administration's open-ended "war on terror." Back then, Musharraf tried to draw the line between "freedom fighters" operating against India, and misguided jihadists that Pakistan once hoped would provide strategic depth in Afghanistan. This distinction was tenuous then, and has become more so over time.
Some of Pakistan's previous jihadi assets have now turned against the state, which has already suffered over 5,000 casualties since 2007. Other "assets" remain quiescent, but allegiances can change quickly, and Pakistan's security apparatus may have difficulty taking on all comers. Pakistan's Army has begun the hard tasks of tackling internal security threats, but neither the Army nor civilian agencies are adept at winning hearts and minds.
Particularly difficult choices now lie between the horns of Pakistan's security dilemma. Without more concerted counter-terrorism efforts, additional explosions are likely to occur in both Pakistan and India. But a more comprehensive crackdown by Pakistan's security forces would surely result in even more of an upsurge in mass casualty attacks.
Put another way, a forward leaning counter-terrorism strategy will produce heavy blowback, but ultimately it leads to a revived Pakistan. Alternatively, Pakistan's leaders might hope for a breathing spell by not further prosecuting internal security threats. But this choice would hasten their country's long-term decline.
Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center and author of Better Safe than Sorry, The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2009).
http://epaper.khaleejtimes.com/KT/KT/2010/01/30/ArticleHtmls/30_01_2010_009_002.shtml
The secret war in Pakistan
Michael Williams
The Guardian
04 February 2010
Yes, there is a secret war going on in Pakistan, and it is one George W Bush should have started nine years ago. After the US abandoned Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Pakistan supported Islamist groups in a bid to secure a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul. When Bush went into Afghanistan in 2001 with no plan other than to kick out the Taliban, he also threw billions of dollars at Pakistan to help in the "war on terror".
Islamabad, however, did nothing to root out Islamist radicals near the border with Afghanistan, nor did it spend the $12bn on developing governance. Instead, the Pakistani government bought equipment such as F-16s to use in a war against India. Why the Bush administration allowed this to happen by selling them the equipment is beyond imagination.
It became pretty apparent a few years ago that it did not matter what Nato forces did in Afghanistan if the Taliban were allowed to operate freely in Pakistan. If the Quetta Shura the Taliban command based in the Pakistani city of Quetta and other Taliban bases in remote parts of Baluchistan, for example, were not eradicated, then sending more troops to Afghanistan was pointless. Withdrawing international forces from Afghanistan also won't solve the problem, because the Taliban forces would then just return to dig into Afghanistan to oust the current government. Given what the Taliban allowed to occur when they were last in power this is an unacceptable option for Washington, London and the rest of Nato. Furthermore, despite all the problems in Afghanistan, the current government is far more popular today with the average Afghan than were the Taliban.
The problems are multiple. The civilian government is too weak to take on the Taliban on its own. Some segments of the Pakistani military actually support the Taliban. They see the Taliban as a way to ensure a friendly government in Kabul, necessary for strategic depth in a war against India. If the US was to reduce the power of the Taliban, the situation in Pakistan needed to be addressed. Assassination of Taliban leaders using drones began under Bush and the programme quite rightly accelerated under Obama. So far in 2010 there have been a dozen drone strikes a large increase on the average for 2009, which was about one per week.
The presence of US forces on the ground is rightly more contentious. But US forces, as well as British SAS forces, have been operating in Pakistan at various points for years. Initially this was without authorisation from the Pakistani government and often because of mistrust between US and Pakistan forces. But after this most recent attack both Washington and Islamabad have to grudgingly admit that they are working closely with each other. Islamabad has been loth to admit the extent to which US forces are helping the Pakistani military with counter-insurgency training, never mind the fact that US forces are at times engaging in operations within Pakistani territory. Given that 80% of Pakistanis reject American assistance in fighting the Taliban, it was perhaps a wise move to keep the issue quiet.
Ultimately the "secret war" in Pakistan represents an alternative model to Bush's very public "war on terror". Bush used the war on terror as a rhetorical tool to terrorise Americans into supporting a massive, ineffective global war abroad while taking away their civil rights at home. Obama and his administration have articulated a much more nuanced policy that does not reduce every actor to a "terrorist". It does not utilise grand rhetoric that elevates "terrorists" to the principal threat facing the US. It pushes them into dark corners, where they should be. It attempts to distinguish between al-Qaida and Taliban. It seems to classify Taliban into different groups.
It is a strategy for using American power effectively, rather than blundering into countries with no clear or definable objectives. Most importantly, it is a strategy that goes after the real problems rather than creating new ones, as was the case in Iraq. It is also one that is backed up with significant amounts of economic and development assistance $1.5bn a year for Pakistan alone.
I have no doubt that this "secret war" being waged by the US with the approval of Islamabad will not be popular with many. At the end of the day, however, the US president is elected to keep the American people safe and to expect an administration not to act in the hope that the situation will just fix itself is fantasy.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/04/pakistan-us-secret-war
Editorial: ‘Strategic death’?
Daily Times
03 February 2010
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in a rare press briefing, said, “We want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not want to control it.” These words underlie the fact that the Pakistan Army has still not given up on the idea of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan — a policy that has proved to be disastrous for Pakistan in the past few decades. If one reads between the lines, General Kayani’s statement is also indicative that though Pakistan may not want to control Afghanistan, it wants a government of its own choice in place to control the war-torn country. While General Kayani boasted that the successful military operations in the tribal areas have led to a substantial decline in cross-border attacks on Nato forces in Afghanistan, militants in Peshawar blew up a tanker carrying fuel for the Nato forces on Monday. This is not to say that the general was wrong in his assumptions; of course there have been fewer incidents of this sort in the recent past as the militants were engaged in heavy fighting with the Pakistan military. It has finally dawned on the military that to tackle this rising militancy, it has to crush the terrorist network. General Kayani’s remark that “a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan a strategic depth” speaks of a realisation that we can ill-afford a volatile neighbour at a time when there is already a tenuous security situation within our own borders.
In view of the various international conferences recently held on resolving the Afghan conundrum, General Kayani has offered Pakistan’s services in the training of the Afghan National Army. India has already implemented a similar offer and in view of the burgeoning trust deficit between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the balance of favour may tilt towards India. Inevitably, Pakistan will not be too happy about it if this continues. But we have to realise that Pakistan should have offered to help the Afghan army a long time ago instead of waiting for India to make the first move and then jump belatedly onto the bandwagon. A proxy war developing between India and Pakistan on Afghan soil is no secret any more; the army chief’s ‘concerns’ about the Afghan army developing a potential to take on Pakistan come in the wake of India’s entry into the Afghanistan imbroglio. Both India and Pakistan must stop trying to outdo each other, as it will only further destabilise the region. A peaceful Afghanistan will translate into a peaceful South Asia.
After the London conference, efforts to reconcile with ‘soft’ elements in the Taliban are underway. The Taliban leadership has declined this olive branch as it has gained strongholds in many important areas of Afghanistan and sees itself coming back to power once the US-led Nato forces leave the country. Some observers are of the view that the reconciliation drive will not bear any fruit due to the persistent intra-tribe and factional tussles in Afghanistan. Insiders in Afghanistan say that the Taliban will not give up their stance against the international forces and cannot be bought. President Karzai is trying to get Saudi help in mediating between Kabul and the Taliban.
Scepticism over the reconciliatory efforts has a lot of weight, as the foreign forces now seem inclined to cut their losses and withdraw. If the US-led forces leave Afghanistan in a quagmire this time around, the world will have to pay an even heavier price than last time. As for Pakistan, our military should be very cautious in supporting the Afghan Taliban. What if the Afghan Taliban, after coming to power in Kabul, support the Pakistani Taliban? After all, nuclear-armed Pakistan is a bigger prize than even Afghanistan. GHQ should revisit the infection in the armed services of jihadi sympathisers. A nightmare scenario is looming if we do not give up the idea of ‘strategic depth’, which may eventually turn out to be ‘strategic death’.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\03\story_3-2-2010_pg3_1
It is within us
Kamran Shafi
Dawn
09 February 2010
There has been a veritable raft of statements from the chief of army staff in the very recent past on ‘strategic depth’ for Pakistan in Afghanistan.
Variously: “we want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not want to control it”; “if Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly, we have our strategic depth because our western border is secure”; and “our strategic paradigm needs to be fully realised”. Inexplicably he also said that ‘it would be a cause of worry for Pakistan if Afghanistan’s projected army developed the potential to take on Pakistan’.
The Afghan army’s ‘projected’ development (woefully inadequate five years after it started, mark) and whether that development can be a danger to Pakistan with its half-a-million strong army and a powerful air force when Afghanistan has no air force at all at the present time, to say nothing of our bomb, we shall come to later. Let us for the moment look at ‘strategic depth’.
Now then, whilst matters as critical as strategic depth, especially in other, foreign countries, are best discussed in their minutiae in closed confabulations of elected political leaders, diplomats and military experts, let us look at the many hurdles in the way of the general’s wishes coming true.
While the Afghans can heave a sigh of relief that Pakistan will not take over their country to gain strategic depth, how can Afghanistan ever become peaceful, and stable, and friendly towards Pakistan when the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqani father-son team, well known as friends of our very own security establishment, run around that country spreading havoc from Ghazni to Kunar to Paktia?
How can Afghanistan become friendly towards Pakistan when there is continuing ambivalence in wholeheartedly targeting the Taliban leadership, both Afghan and Pakistani, which as we well know are closely allied? How possibly can Afghanistan call Pakistan a friend when senior Pakistani army officers refer to these people, its enemies, as ‘assets’?
On another tack, how can the ultimate leaders of groups that also attack innocent Pakistanis in Peshawar and Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi be the strategic assets of our brass hats?
How can Afghanistan consider Pakistan a friend when the Quetta shura of the Afghan Taliban which has now been outed by no less a personage than the minister of defence, is not even touched let alone degraded to an extent that it will cease being a threat to Afghanistan? When its leaders openly defy government authority and do as they will in Balochistan, extending their murderous tentacles into Iran too?
Unless, of course, it is still the case that our great strategists feel that the Taliban, both the Pakistan and Afghan variety, are the only ones who can ensure a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. If so, they have very bad memories, for they do not have to look very far back into Afghanistan’s sorry history to see how badly this, for want of a better word, scheme, failed so very miserably the last time around, with the Afghan people facing untold tribulations at the hands of a backward and medieval regime.
How possibly can the Afghans see Pakistan as a friend when they see that their tormentors and the Pakistani security establishment are still friends? No sirs, no, Afghanistan will never consider Pakistan a friend unless those who have made mindless statements about the Taliban being assets retract those statements in totality and without reservation. And far more than that take stringent action against all of the terrorists without exception.
As for the Afghan national security forces, the army and police, developing to the point that they can ‘take on’ Pakistan, those two forces are slated to rise to 171,600 men for the army and 134,000 for the police by the year 2011.
Both the projected numbers fly in the face of the views of independent observers and analysts trained to make such projections who say unreservedly that let alone the non-availability of suitable manpower, the mere costs of maintaining such numbers are way above the capacity of the Afghan government. Empirical evidence also shows that fully 40 per cent of present recruits came out positive when tested for drugs. So much for the Afghan forces ever being able to ‘take on’ Pakistan.
As to our strategic paradigm(s) being realised by other people, I can only say that whingeing will get us nowhere because no one owes us anything at all. We Pakistanis are the only ones who can, and should, realise what those paradigms are, and how we can best achieve them. We have to understand that the best strategic depth is that which comes from within our own country, from within ourselves. That the best strategic depth is that which comes from within our own people.
All of us have to understand that instead of looking beyond our borders, a literate, healthy and happy populace that lives in peace and tranquillity is the best strategic depth any country can possibly have. This, of course, cannot be, given the state of the country as it is today with completely skewed national imperatives, and a state whose writ is eroding by the day.
For, how can Pakistan educate its children in halfway decent schools; or give its people halfway decent healthcare and housing when only three per cent of the budget goes to the social sector? How can the people feel at peace when the mainstream press carries photographs of private, mark, anti-aircraft guns deployed in a cotton field in Sindh?
Instead of looking towards others it is time we sat up and took notice of the dire situation we are in. And jolly well did something about it.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/13+kamran-shafi-it-is-within-us-920-za-01
Further Reading
Pakistan: vindication on Afghanistan, assertive with India
Nirupama Subramanian
The Hindu
07 February 2010
A constructive role by Pakistan is likely to come attached with the demand that the international community address its “legitimate” concerns and issues in the region.Some of those concerns were articulated by the Pakistan Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani when, in two meetings with journalists this week, he said India remains the primary threat to Pakistan and the focus of the Pakistani military. He spoke of the peace, security and stability of Afghanistan as the main element of Pakistan’s “strategic depth”, and said Pakistan had a more “legitimate” expectation in the matter of training the Afghan security forces than India.
http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article102550.ece?homepage=true
Pakistan: ditching “strategic depth”
Myra MacDonald
Reuters
19 January 2010
Pakistan’s policy of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan has been up for discussion since 9/11, when it was forced to abandon the Taliban regime it had backed to try to contain Indian influence there and give itself the space that it felt was so lacking on its eastern border. I have heard Pakistanis saying it was a stupid idea; others saying that even within the Pakistan Army there was a recognition that strategic depth nowadays was best achieved through building a strong domestic economy.
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2010/01/20/pakistan-ditching-strategic-depth/
State of Failure - India and Pakistan are joined at the hip
Krishnan Srinivasan
The Telegraph
01 February 2010
Attempts by Pakistan to influence Kabul are designed to co-opt a neighbour to counter India to the east, although the ‘strategic depth’ that Pakistan craves makes no modern military sense and the Pakistanis failed to install a pliable government in Kabul even after the Russian withdrawal.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100201/jsp/opinion/story_12042796.jsp
Bad news from Afghanistan
Balbir K Punj
The Pioneer
01 February 2010
As Pakistan still has considerable sway over the Taliban, once they are back in power in Kabul, Islamabad will regain its strategic depth. All this while Pakistan’s strategy has been to reacquire full control over Afghanistan through a proxy regime and reverse the Indian presence in that country.
http://www.dailypioneer.com/232855/Bad-news-from-Afghanistan.html
A win-win situation
Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Dawn
14 February 2010
At this delicate juncture hare-brained ideas of strategic depth and coercive diplomacy should be farthest from our minds. The government is in an unenviable position given the monumental problems it has both inherited and created for itself internally. It should focus at the strategic picture, cut down its liabilities and establish realistic priorities. Peace with India and within Afghanistan should be at the top.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/12-a-winwin-situation-420--bi-05
Folly, not clash of institutions
Ayaz Amir
The News
29 January 2010
Angels from heaven can descend tomorrow and minister to the needs of the Islamic Republic, but the ideological warriors and the definers of strategic depth -- one and the same thing -- won't be satisfied. Why do they suffer the Constitution? Why do they endure civilian trappings? If they are so impatient with democracy they should make Myanmar their model and once and for all have done with the charade of democracy.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=221814
(Views expressed in this Issue Brief are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
Centre for Land Warfare Studies
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Special Issue Brief
Team CLAWS
Recently, a number of commentators have reflected on Pakistan’s concept of strategic depth. Here we present a selection of relevant articles, as also some material for further reading.
Strategic Depth
Lt Gen Asad Durrani (Retd)
CLAWS Article No. 1487
06 February 2010
Strategic Depth is a sound concept. All countries strive to gain and retain it. It is not merely a geographical or spatial notion, but has many dimensions: military, economic, demographic, social and political; and indeed internal and external.
Russia is a quintessential case of a country endowed with wide spaces that were used strategically in its war against Napoleon and in the Second World War. During the bipolar era, its East European satellites and Central Asian republics provided it with additional depth, externally. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia remained interested in its “near abroad”. That illustrates the significance of this factor.
Israel, because of its very different environment, has taken another path to achieve the same effects. Critically lacking physical depth internally, it has primarily relied upon military power and American support to overcome this handicap, and gain territory externally. But its strategic depth essentially lies thousands of kilometers away, in the US.
Objectives of this concept are indeed best served by a country’s inherent internal strength. All the same, alliances with other countries are helpful and at times unavoidable.
Afghanistan was once assigned the role of a “buffer” between the Soviet and the British Empires; to create strategic depth for both of them. When the latter left the Region and India was partitioned, Afghanistan continued to provide (forward) strategic depth to Pakistan, the successor state in the West, vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Pakistan lost it when Afghanistan was occupied by the Soviets. Its help to the Afghan resistance was aimed at restoring the status quo anti.
Indeed, it also had an Indian context. With the Soviets now on its Western borders and India in the East, Pakistan was- what at that time was called- in a “nutcracker situation”. Considering that the pre-invasion Afghanistan had never exploited its periods of wars with India, Pakistan was all the more desperate to get the Soviet occupation vacated.
There has been plenty of criticism of Pakistan’s policy of helping the Afghan resistance. Some may do so because, according to them, it spread drugs, weapons and militancy in the region. Others opposed to Zia-ul-Haq were loath to support a policy that carried his name (and must have been very depressed when with the Soviet withdrawal it achieved its primary objective). They have every right to run down the policy, but to malign in the process a valid doctrine is a bit devious.
(Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the views either of the Editorial Committee or the Centre for Land Warfare Studies).
http://claws.in/index.php?action=master&task=488&u_id=101
Defining "Strategic Depth"
Kamran Shafi
Dawn
19 January 2010
Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan to disengage itself from the fighting, if India goes to war with Pakistan? And how does it help us? We are engaged in the Great Game in Afghanistan, we are told, because ‘strategic depth’ is vital for Pakistan due to the fact that our country is very narrow at its middle and could well be cut into half by an Indian attack in force.
Strategic depth, we are further informed, will give respite to our armed forces which could withdraw into Afghanistan to then regroup and mount counter-attacks on Indian forces in Pakistan. I ask you!
I ask you for several reasons. Let us presume that the Indians are foolish enough to get distracted from educating their people, some of whom go to some of the best centres of learning in the world. Let us assume that they are idiotic enough to opt for war instead of industrialising themselves and meeting their economic growth targets which are among the highest in the world.
Let us imagine that they are cretinous enough to go to war with a nuclear-armed Pakistan and effectively put an immediate and complete end to their multi-million dollar tourism industry. Let us suppose that they lose all sense, all reason, and actually attack Pakistan and cut our country into half.
Will our army pack its bags and escape into Afghanistan? How will it disengage itself from the fighting? What route will it use, through which mountain passes? Will the Peshawar Corps gun its tanks and troop carriers and trucks and towed artillery and head into the Khyber Pass, and on to Jalalabad? Will the Karachi and Quetta Corps do likewise through the Bolan and Khojak passes?
And what happens to the Lahore and Sialkot and Multan and Gujranwala and Bahawalpur and other garrisons? What about the air force? Far more than anything else, what about the by now 180 million people of the country? What ‘strategic depth’ do our Rommels and Guderians talk about, please? What poppycock is this?
More importantly, how can Afghanistan be our ‘strategic depth’ when most Afghans hate our guts, not only the northerners, but even those who call themselves Pakhtuns?
Case in point: the absolute and repeated refusal of even the Taliban government when it was misruling Afghanistan, to accept the Durand Line as the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite the fact that it was a surrogate of Pakistan — propped into power; paid for; and helped militarily, diplomatically and politically by the Pakistani government and its ‘agencies’.
Indeed, it even refused the Commando’s interior minister, the loudmouth Gen Moinuddin Haider when he went to Kabul to ask for the extradition of Pakistani criminals being sheltered by the Taliban. We must remember that the Commando, as chief executive of the country, was pressing the Foreign Office till just a few days before 9/11 to use every effort to have the Taliban regime’ recognised by more countries!
This poppycock of ‘strategic depth’ can only be explained by our great military thinkers and strategists and geniuses: it is not for mortals like yours truly to make sense of any of it. Particularly because this nonsense can only happen after the Americans depart from Afghanistan. And what, pray, is the guarantee that they will leave when they say they will?
Why this subject at this time, you might well ask. Well I have just been reading David Sanger’s The Inheritance in which he meticulously lays out the reasons why he believes the Pakistani “dual policy” towards the Taliban exists.
On page 247 he states that when Michael McConnell, the then chief of US National Intelligence went to Pakistan in late May 2008 (three months after the elections that trounced Musharraf and his King’s Party, mark) he heard Pakistani officers make the case for the Pakistani need for having a friendly government in Kabul after the Americans departed.
When he got back to Washington McConnell “ordered up a full assessment” of the situation. ‘It did not take long … Musharraf’s record of duplicity was well known. While Kayani was a favourite of the White House, he had also been overheard — presumably on telephone intercepts — referring to one of the most brutal of the Taliban leaders, Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani, as a “strategic asset”. Interesting, for Kayani’s former boss, Musharraf is quoted thus in Der Spiegel:
Spiegel: “Let us talk about the role of the ISI. A short time ago, US newspapers reported that ISI has systematically supported Taliban groups. Is that true?”
Musharraf: “Intelligence always has access to other networks — this is what Americans did with KGB, this is what ISI also does. You should understand that the army is on board to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda. I have always been against the Taliban. Don’t try to lecture us about how we should handle this tactically. I will give you an example: Siraj Haqqani ...”
Spiegel: “... a powerful Taliban commander who is allegedly secretly allied with the ISI.”
Musharraf: “He is the man who has influence over Baitullah Mehsud, a dangerous terrorist, the fiercest commander in South Waziristan and the murderer of Benazir Bhutto as we know today. Mehsud kidnapped our ambassador in Kabul and our intelligence used Haqqani’s influence to get him released. Now, that does not mean that Haqqani is supported by us. The intelligence service is using certain enemies against other enemies. And it is better to tackle them one by one than making them all enemies.”
Well, there they go again!
But back to ‘strategic depth’. Will the likes of Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, help Pakistan gain this ‘depth’ in Afghanistan? Are we that gone that we need these backward yahoos to save our army?
PS By the way what about our nuclear weapons? Are they not enough to stop the Indians in their tracks? What poppycock is this ‘strategic depth’?!
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/14-defining-strategic-depth-910
Analysis: Zaid Hamid and strategic depth
Farhat Taj
Daily Times
13 February 2010
What are we first of all: Muslim or Pakistani? Is our ultimate commitment with Pakistani citizenship or a global Muslim brotherhood? What kind of Pakistan should we aim at: a progressive multi-ethnic social democracy or some kind of medieval caliphate?
FATA continues to be used and abused as a strategic space by the security establishment of Pakistan in violent pursuit of strategic depth in Afghanistan. In short, strategic depth means Pakistan must have a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan by any and all means. People of FATA have suffered more than people in any other part of Pakistan due to this policy. They dread and hate ‘strategic depth’.
Some people of FATA drew my attention towards Zaid Hamid, who, they said, is a new charm offensive of the military establishment to popularise the notion of strategic depth among the youth from affluent families in the big cities of Pakistan. He is frequently given air time by the electronic media, also an evidence that the media, especially the Urdu media, is not free and has to toe the establishment’s line in security matters. Show biz celebrities have joined him. Those who oppose the strategic depth, especially the Pakhtun, who are the biggest casualty of it, are never given so much media attention.
The main concern of the people of FATA vis-a-vis Zaid Hamid is his use of a particularly narrow interpretation of Islam that proposes a belligerent agenda for the Pakistan Army and drawing on controversial Islamic literature. Thus the authenticity of the hadiths — sayings of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) — on Ghazwa-e-Hind that he often refers to in terms of the ultimate defeat of the Indians at the hands of the Pakistan Army is highly questionable.
Zaid Hamid claims in his speeches to young people that God determines the destiny of Pakistan. Pakistan will become a grand Caliphate. Pakistan army will cut India down to the size of Sri Lanka. Pakistan will lead the entire Muslim world and its army will be deployed in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and Afghanistan. The corrupt judicial system, consisting of the lawyers and the Supreme Court of Pakistan, will be replaced by an Islamic judicial system that would ensure — Taliban style — speedy and cheap justice. He claims that the current elected set up in Pakistan is implanted by the CIA and prophesies that the current rulers in Pakistan will have their dead bodies hanging on poles in Islamabad, an indirect appreciation of what the Taliban did in Afghanistan with the dead body of Dr Najibullah, the then Afghan president. He openly threatens the nationalists, especially the Pakhtun and Baloch nationalists, for their aspirations. The Taliban government in Afghanistan, he declares, was Pakistan-friendly and condemns its removal by the US in the post-9/11 attack on the country. He glorifies the biggest mass murderer of the Pakhtun — General Zia, the former dictator of Pakistan.
Judging by the obscurantist message that he communicates, Zaid Hamid does not seem to be a new invention of the establishment. He is an addition to the long list of people who have been handpicked to promote an anti-people agenda in the name of religion and hate of India, like the people from the Jamaat-e-Islami. What seems to be new is his apparent ‘tolerance’ of the ‘un-Islamic’ lifestyle of the urban youth and in this context there are some interesting discussions about Zaid Hamid on some blogs and mailing lists. One blogger writes that Zaid Hamid is using a new strategy to communicate the same old conspiracy theories to young people. The strategy is that unlike classical Islamic scholars, joining Zaid Hamid’s group does not necessarily require the youth to shed their sophisticated lifestyle and adjust to hijab, a ban on music and gender segregation. The only thing they have to do is to glorify the Pakistan Army, including its pursuit of strategic depth, and hate Jews, Americans and Indians.
A writer on one of the mailing lists argues that Zaid Hamid is a Pied Piper for our youth from the prosperous sections of Punjab who have no dreams to be proud of. Zaid Hamid sells the dreams of conquering the world, though they are nonsense, yet still work for the youth who are now caught up in an identity crisis, continues the writer. The writer understands that the fault lies with the leftist intellectuals who have lost direction by joining NGOs and leaving the anti-imperialist struggle open for people like Zaid Hamid or Imran Khan.
Zaid Hamid, in his show, sets a dangerous agenda for the youth of Pakistan; the very same youth who are living a comfortable life in poverty-stricken Pakistan. They lack any ambitions in life to give it some purpose. This lack of goals is rooted in the identity crisis being faced by the Pakistani youth. The crisis is expressed in questions like these: what are we first of all: Muslim or Pakistani? Is our ultimate commitment with Pakistani citizenship or a global Muslim brotherhood? What kind of Pakistan should we aim at: a progressive multi-ethnic social democracy or some kind of medieval caliphate?
Secondly, one has to strive very hard for ideals. If the ideal is the former (multi-ethnic social democratic Pakistan), the youth from affluent families will have to share their riches with the poor, downtrodden fellow citizens. This is very hard for this class of people, otherwise I would at least have seen them working for bringing normalcy in the shattered lives of the people of FATA, who have been living in deplorable conditions in refugee camps for over two years now. In the latter case (caliphate) they can placate their conscience by attaching themselves with the higher ideal without having to give up something from their comfortable lives. The only thing they have to do is to support the belligerent agenda of the military establishment and their poor fellow Pakistanis can go to hell. Zaid Hamid’s campaign is like opium for the young that makes them run away from reality, i.e. Pakistan is a class-based multi-ethnic society that cannot be held together with mere Islamic rhetoric and military ambitions.
What is even more dangerous is the fact that Zaid Hamid is glorifying the same Taliban that the people of FATA hold responsible for their massacre at the behest of the military establishment of Pakistan. Case in point, Jalaluddin Haqqani who occupies North Waziristan. I would invite the young fans of Zaid Hamid to take a tour of FATA, or at least FATA IDP camps in various parts of the NWFP, to observe firsthand what the Taliban and the military did to these people. I would remind the youth that people all over FATA hold the generals of the Pakistan Army more than the Taliban responsible for the death and destruction in their area. They view the Taliban — all Taliban, good, bad, Afghan or Pakistani — as a creation of the intelligence agencies of our country. How much more do the people of FATA need to sacrifice for strategic depth in Afghanistan? The never-ending human sufferings in the area could transform into widespread anti-state sentiments. The youth around Zaid Hamid must know that the current pursuit of strategic depth may turn into — as rightly described in this paper’s editorial ‘Strategic death’? (Daily Times, February 3, 2010) –’strategic death’ for Pakistan rather than securing a friendly Afghanistan.
The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. She can be reached at bergen34@yahoo.com
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\13\story_13-2-2010_pg3_4
The Fallacy of the Last Move in Pakistan
Michael Krepon
The Khaleej Times
30 January 2010
This would be a good time for Pakistan and India to negotiate new nuclear risk reduction measures, as both countries may well be in the lull between crises sparked by extremists with links to Pakistan. But one of the many paradoxes related to nuclear weapons is that when reductions in nuclear dangers are most needed, they can be hardest to implement. New Delhi is still smarting from the last mass casualty attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 that killed almost 170 innocent bystanders. The attackers were trained and equipped in Pakistan. They were affiliated with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that was ostensibly banned by General Pervez Musharraf, but which still enjoys considerable autonomy.
Islamabad sensibly calls for a resumption of official dialogue with India. New Delhi sensibly argues that Pakistan must do more to fulfill oft-repeated pledges that its soil not be used as the springboard for cross-border terrorism. Some of those who helped the Mumbai attackers are now on trial in Pakistan. The outcome of this trial will help determine when official bilateral talks might resume. But it is already crystal clear that the most important nuclear risk reduction measure on the subcontinent would be more concerted efforts by the security apparatus in Pakistan to clamp down on extremist groups that use that country as a base.
Pakistan is now caught on the horns of a dilemma: the "assets" it supported to place pressure on India have now become liabilities. Pakistanis blames others for this dilemma, most notably the United States, which also supported Islamic militancy when it served the purpose of removing the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The United States unwisely walked away from both Pakistan and Afghanistan after the Soviet exit, while Pakistan's security apparatus unwisely decided to redirect jihadi tactics against India.
Had Washington remained in Afghanistan after 1989, Pakistan would in all probability still have employed surrogates to control that ill-fated land, as has been evident by its support for the Afghan Taliban after the U.S. returned to oust Mullah Omar and al Qaida. But in cutting off ties to the Pakistan military with the imposition of the Pressler Amendment - triggered not by the Soviet departure, but by Pakistani uranium enrichment activities during the 1990 crisis with India - Washington lost for a decade whatever influence it might have had on Pakistan-Indian relations. During this time, jihadi groups dined at the ISI's table, and caused considerable grief in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.
It did not take a great gift of prophesy to predict that Pakistan's tactics would eventually backfire. Using violence to draw international attention to the "nuclear flashpoint" of Kashmir initially served Pakistan's interests. But the more its security apparatus played with fire, the more Pakistan's domestic and economic fortunes declined. One decisive turning point came with the 1999 Kargil War, which stripped away the last vestiges of plausible deniability regarding Pakistan's use of surrogates to leverage the Kashmir dispute. No single development did more to solidify international support for the status quo along the Kashmir divide than the Kargil misadventure. Another decisive pivot came after 9/11, when General Musharraf had little choice but to sever ties with an Afghan government hosting al Qaida and to join the Bush administration's open-ended "war on terror." Back then, Musharraf tried to draw the line between "freedom fighters" operating against India, and misguided jihadists that Pakistan once hoped would provide strategic depth in Afghanistan. This distinction was tenuous then, and has become more so over time.
Some of Pakistan's previous jihadi assets have now turned against the state, which has already suffered over 5,000 casualties since 2007. Other "assets" remain quiescent, but allegiances can change quickly, and Pakistan's security apparatus may have difficulty taking on all comers. Pakistan's Army has begun the hard tasks of tackling internal security threats, but neither the Army nor civilian agencies are adept at winning hearts and minds.
Particularly difficult choices now lie between the horns of Pakistan's security dilemma. Without more concerted counter-terrorism efforts, additional explosions are likely to occur in both Pakistan and India. But a more comprehensive crackdown by Pakistan's security forces would surely result in even more of an upsurge in mass casualty attacks.
Put another way, a forward leaning counter-terrorism strategy will produce heavy blowback, but ultimately it leads to a revived Pakistan. Alternatively, Pakistan's leaders might hope for a breathing spell by not further prosecuting internal security threats. But this choice would hasten their country's long-term decline.
Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center and author of Better Safe than Sorry, The Ironies of Living with the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 2009).
http://epaper.khaleejtimes.com/KT/KT/2010/01/30/ArticleHtmls/30_01_2010_009_002.shtml
The secret war in Pakistan
Michael Williams
The Guardian
04 February 2010
Yes, there is a secret war going on in Pakistan, and it is one George W Bush should have started nine years ago. After the US abandoned Afghanistan following Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Pakistan supported Islamist groups in a bid to secure a pro-Islamabad government in Kabul. When Bush went into Afghanistan in 2001 with no plan other than to kick out the Taliban, he also threw billions of dollars at Pakistan to help in the "war on terror".
Islamabad, however, did nothing to root out Islamist radicals near the border with Afghanistan, nor did it spend the $12bn on developing governance. Instead, the Pakistani government bought equipment such as F-16s to use in a war against India. Why the Bush administration allowed this to happen by selling them the equipment is beyond imagination.
It became pretty apparent a few years ago that it did not matter what Nato forces did in Afghanistan if the Taliban were allowed to operate freely in Pakistan. If the Quetta Shura the Taliban command based in the Pakistani city of Quetta and other Taliban bases in remote parts of Baluchistan, for example, were not eradicated, then sending more troops to Afghanistan was pointless. Withdrawing international forces from Afghanistan also won't solve the problem, because the Taliban forces would then just return to dig into Afghanistan to oust the current government. Given what the Taliban allowed to occur when they were last in power this is an unacceptable option for Washington, London and the rest of Nato. Furthermore, despite all the problems in Afghanistan, the current government is far more popular today with the average Afghan than were the Taliban.
The problems are multiple. The civilian government is too weak to take on the Taliban on its own. Some segments of the Pakistani military actually support the Taliban. They see the Taliban as a way to ensure a friendly government in Kabul, necessary for strategic depth in a war against India. If the US was to reduce the power of the Taliban, the situation in Pakistan needed to be addressed. Assassination of Taliban leaders using drones began under Bush and the programme quite rightly accelerated under Obama. So far in 2010 there have been a dozen drone strikes a large increase on the average for 2009, which was about one per week.
The presence of US forces on the ground is rightly more contentious. But US forces, as well as British SAS forces, have been operating in Pakistan at various points for years. Initially this was without authorisation from the Pakistani government and often because of mistrust between US and Pakistan forces. But after this most recent attack both Washington and Islamabad have to grudgingly admit that they are working closely with each other. Islamabad has been loth to admit the extent to which US forces are helping the Pakistani military with counter-insurgency training, never mind the fact that US forces are at times engaging in operations within Pakistani territory. Given that 80% of Pakistanis reject American assistance in fighting the Taliban, it was perhaps a wise move to keep the issue quiet.
Ultimately the "secret war" in Pakistan represents an alternative model to Bush's very public "war on terror". Bush used the war on terror as a rhetorical tool to terrorise Americans into supporting a massive, ineffective global war abroad while taking away their civil rights at home. Obama and his administration have articulated a much more nuanced policy that does not reduce every actor to a "terrorist". It does not utilise grand rhetoric that elevates "terrorists" to the principal threat facing the US. It pushes them into dark corners, where they should be. It attempts to distinguish between al-Qaida and Taliban. It seems to classify Taliban into different groups.
It is a strategy for using American power effectively, rather than blundering into countries with no clear or definable objectives. Most importantly, it is a strategy that goes after the real problems rather than creating new ones, as was the case in Iraq. It is also one that is backed up with significant amounts of economic and development assistance $1.5bn a year for Pakistan alone.
I have no doubt that this "secret war" being waged by the US with the approval of Islamabad will not be popular with many. At the end of the day, however, the US president is elected to keep the American people safe and to expect an administration not to act in the hope that the situation will just fix itself is fantasy.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/feb/04/pakistan-us-secret-war
Editorial: ‘Strategic death’?
Daily Times
03 February 2010
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, in a rare press briefing, said, “We want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not want to control it.” These words underlie the fact that the Pakistan Army has still not given up on the idea of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan — a policy that has proved to be disastrous for Pakistan in the past few decades. If one reads between the lines, General Kayani’s statement is also indicative that though Pakistan may not want to control Afghanistan, it wants a government of its own choice in place to control the war-torn country. While General Kayani boasted that the successful military operations in the tribal areas have led to a substantial decline in cross-border attacks on Nato forces in Afghanistan, militants in Peshawar blew up a tanker carrying fuel for the Nato forces on Monday. This is not to say that the general was wrong in his assumptions; of course there have been fewer incidents of this sort in the recent past as the militants were engaged in heavy fighting with the Pakistan military. It has finally dawned on the military that to tackle this rising militancy, it has to crush the terrorist network. General Kayani’s remark that “a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan a strategic depth” speaks of a realisation that we can ill-afford a volatile neighbour at a time when there is already a tenuous security situation within our own borders.
In view of the various international conferences recently held on resolving the Afghan conundrum, General Kayani has offered Pakistan’s services in the training of the Afghan National Army. India has already implemented a similar offer and in view of the burgeoning trust deficit between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the balance of favour may tilt towards India. Inevitably, Pakistan will not be too happy about it if this continues. But we have to realise that Pakistan should have offered to help the Afghan army a long time ago instead of waiting for India to make the first move and then jump belatedly onto the bandwagon. A proxy war developing between India and Pakistan on Afghan soil is no secret any more; the army chief’s ‘concerns’ about the Afghan army developing a potential to take on Pakistan come in the wake of India’s entry into the Afghanistan imbroglio. Both India and Pakistan must stop trying to outdo each other, as it will only further destabilise the region. A peaceful Afghanistan will translate into a peaceful South Asia.
After the London conference, efforts to reconcile with ‘soft’ elements in the Taliban are underway. The Taliban leadership has declined this olive branch as it has gained strongholds in many important areas of Afghanistan and sees itself coming back to power once the US-led Nato forces leave the country. Some observers are of the view that the reconciliation drive will not bear any fruit due to the persistent intra-tribe and factional tussles in Afghanistan. Insiders in Afghanistan say that the Taliban will not give up their stance against the international forces and cannot be bought. President Karzai is trying to get Saudi help in mediating between Kabul and the Taliban.
Scepticism over the reconciliatory efforts has a lot of weight, as the foreign forces now seem inclined to cut their losses and withdraw. If the US-led forces leave Afghanistan in a quagmire this time around, the world will have to pay an even heavier price than last time. As for Pakistan, our military should be very cautious in supporting the Afghan Taliban. What if the Afghan Taliban, after coming to power in Kabul, support the Pakistani Taliban? After all, nuclear-armed Pakistan is a bigger prize than even Afghanistan. GHQ should revisit the infection in the armed services of jihadi sympathisers. A nightmare scenario is looming if we do not give up the idea of ‘strategic depth’, which may eventually turn out to be ‘strategic death’.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\02\03\story_3-2-2010_pg3_1
It is within us
Kamran Shafi
Dawn
09 February 2010
There has been a veritable raft of statements from the chief of army staff in the very recent past on ‘strategic depth’ for Pakistan in Afghanistan.
Variously: “we want a strategic depth in Afghanistan but do not want to control it”; “if Afghanistan is peaceful, stable and friendly, we have our strategic depth because our western border is secure”; and “our strategic paradigm needs to be fully realised”. Inexplicably he also said that ‘it would be a cause of worry for Pakistan if Afghanistan’s projected army developed the potential to take on Pakistan’.
The Afghan army’s ‘projected’ development (woefully inadequate five years after it started, mark) and whether that development can be a danger to Pakistan with its half-a-million strong army and a powerful air force when Afghanistan has no air force at all at the present time, to say nothing of our bomb, we shall come to later. Let us for the moment look at ‘strategic depth’.
Now then, whilst matters as critical as strategic depth, especially in other, foreign countries, are best discussed in their minutiae in closed confabulations of elected political leaders, diplomats and military experts, let us look at the many hurdles in the way of the general’s wishes coming true.
While the Afghans can heave a sigh of relief that Pakistan will not take over their country to gain strategic depth, how can Afghanistan ever become peaceful, and stable, and friendly towards Pakistan when the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqani father-son team, well known as friends of our very own security establishment, run around that country spreading havoc from Ghazni to Kunar to Paktia?
How can Afghanistan become friendly towards Pakistan when there is continuing ambivalence in wholeheartedly targeting the Taliban leadership, both Afghan and Pakistani, which as we well know are closely allied? How possibly can Afghanistan call Pakistan a friend when senior Pakistani army officers refer to these people, its enemies, as ‘assets’?
On another tack, how can the ultimate leaders of groups that also attack innocent Pakistanis in Peshawar and Rawalpindi, Lahore and Karachi be the strategic assets of our brass hats?
How can Afghanistan consider Pakistan a friend when the Quetta shura of the Afghan Taliban which has now been outed by no less a personage than the minister of defence, is not even touched let alone degraded to an extent that it will cease being a threat to Afghanistan? When its leaders openly defy government authority and do as they will in Balochistan, extending their murderous tentacles into Iran too?
Unless, of course, it is still the case that our great strategists feel that the Taliban, both the Pakistan and Afghan variety, are the only ones who can ensure a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan. If so, they have very bad memories, for they do not have to look very far back into Afghanistan’s sorry history to see how badly this, for want of a better word, scheme, failed so very miserably the last time around, with the Afghan people facing untold tribulations at the hands of a backward and medieval regime.
How possibly can the Afghans see Pakistan as a friend when they see that their tormentors and the Pakistani security establishment are still friends? No sirs, no, Afghanistan will never consider Pakistan a friend unless those who have made mindless statements about the Taliban being assets retract those statements in totality and without reservation. And far more than that take stringent action against all of the terrorists without exception.
As for the Afghan national security forces, the army and police, developing to the point that they can ‘take on’ Pakistan, those two forces are slated to rise to 171,600 men for the army and 134,000 for the police by the year 2011.
Both the projected numbers fly in the face of the views of independent observers and analysts trained to make such projections who say unreservedly that let alone the non-availability of suitable manpower, the mere costs of maintaining such numbers are way above the capacity of the Afghan government. Empirical evidence also shows that fully 40 per cent of present recruits came out positive when tested for drugs. So much for the Afghan forces ever being able to ‘take on’ Pakistan.
As to our strategic paradigm(s) being realised by other people, I can only say that whingeing will get us nowhere because no one owes us anything at all. We Pakistanis are the only ones who can, and should, realise what those paradigms are, and how we can best achieve them. We have to understand that the best strategic depth is that which comes from within our own country, from within ourselves. That the best strategic depth is that which comes from within our own people.
All of us have to understand that instead of looking beyond our borders, a literate, healthy and happy populace that lives in peace and tranquillity is the best strategic depth any country can possibly have. This, of course, cannot be, given the state of the country as it is today with completely skewed national imperatives, and a state whose writ is eroding by the day.
For, how can Pakistan educate its children in halfway decent schools; or give its people halfway decent healthcare and housing when only three per cent of the budget goes to the social sector? How can the people feel at peace when the mainstream press carries photographs of private, mark, anti-aircraft guns deployed in a cotton field in Sindh?
Instead of looking towards others it is time we sat up and took notice of the dire situation we are in. And jolly well did something about it.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/columnists/13+kamran-shafi-it-is-within-us-920-za-01
Further Reading
Pakistan: vindication on Afghanistan, assertive with India
Nirupama Subramanian
The Hindu
07 February 2010
A constructive role by Pakistan is likely to come attached with the demand that the international community address its “legitimate” concerns and issues in the region.Some of those concerns were articulated by the Pakistan Army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani when, in two meetings with journalists this week, he said India remains the primary threat to Pakistan and the focus of the Pakistani military. He spoke of the peace, security and stability of Afghanistan as the main element of Pakistan’s “strategic depth”, and said Pakistan had a more “legitimate” expectation in the matter of training the Afghan security forces than India.
http://beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article102550.ece?homepage=true
Pakistan: ditching “strategic depth”
Myra MacDonald
Reuters
19 January 2010
Pakistan’s policy of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan has been up for discussion since 9/11, when it was forced to abandon the Taliban regime it had backed to try to contain Indian influence there and give itself the space that it felt was so lacking on its eastern border. I have heard Pakistanis saying it was a stupid idea; others saying that even within the Pakistan Army there was a recognition that strategic depth nowadays was best achieved through building a strong domestic economy.
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2010/01/20/pakistan-ditching-strategic-depth/
State of Failure - India and Pakistan are joined at the hip
Krishnan Srinivasan
The Telegraph
01 February 2010
Attempts by Pakistan to influence Kabul are designed to co-opt a neighbour to counter India to the east, although the ‘strategic depth’ that Pakistan craves makes no modern military sense and the Pakistanis failed to install a pliable government in Kabul even after the Russian withdrawal.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100201/jsp/opinion/story_12042796.jsp
Bad news from Afghanistan
Balbir K Punj
The Pioneer
01 February 2010
As Pakistan still has considerable sway over the Taliban, once they are back in power in Kabul, Islamabad will regain its strategic depth. All this while Pakistan’s strategy has been to reacquire full control over Afghanistan through a proxy regime and reverse the Indian presence in that country.
http://www.dailypioneer.com/232855/Bad-news-from-Afghanistan.html
A win-win situation
Iqbal Ahmad Khan
Dawn
14 February 2010
At this delicate juncture hare-brained ideas of strategic depth and coercive diplomacy should be farthest from our minds. The government is in an unenviable position given the monumental problems it has both inherited and created for itself internally. It should focus at the strategic picture, cut down its liabilities and establish realistic priorities. Peace with India and within Afghanistan should be at the top.
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/editorial/12-a-winwin-situation-420--bi-05
Folly, not clash of institutions
Ayaz Amir
The News
29 January 2010
Angels from heaven can descend tomorrow and minister to the needs of the Islamic Republic, but the ideological warriors and the definers of strategic depth -- one and the same thing -- won't be satisfied. Why do they suffer the Constitution? Why do they endure civilian trappings? If they are so impatient with democracy they should make Myanmar their model and once and for all have done with the charade of democracy.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=221814
(Views expressed in this Issue Brief are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
Misinterpreting the Quran to Justify Jihad
Misinterpreting the Quran to Justify Jihad
Gurmeet Kanwal
Director, CLAWS
E-Mail-kanwal.gurmeet@gmail.com, gurmeetkanwal@hotmail.com
&
Samarjit Ghosh
samarjit.ghosh@gmail.com
Eight years after the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the United States-led Global War on Terror, the world is still far from eliminating terrorism caused by radical extremists belonging to various Islamist factions. The epicentre of this scourge lies astride the Durand Line in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and the territory ruled by the Taliqaeda in Afghanistan. While the military forces of the US and its coalition partners (NATO and ISAF) are arrayed against the Taliqaeda and have achieved limited success, precious little has been done to explore the role played by radical Islamic teachings in the Taliqaeda’s ongoing war.
It is not clear whether the Taliqaeda terrorists have been brainwashed by certain vested interests to act in an inhuman manner for the sake of waging a holy war against infidels, or whether they are simply following what they believe is laid down in the scriptures. Put another way, are these terrorists motivated singularly by ideals of a self-serving nature and giving vent to their private demons, or is there a more concrete foundation for the acts of horror that they indulge in? If that is so, are they interpreting the Quran to suit their own beliefs, or are they actually following a doctrine of war contained within the scriptures?
Standard analytical texts on the doctrine of war propagated by Prophet Mohammed are practically non-existent. The closest that a book comes to attempting an understanding and explaining the doctrine of war in Islam is The Quranic Concept of War, authored by Brigadier S K Malik of the Pakistan Army. Though it is not a new book, it plays a crucial role in explaining the ‘just war’ theory and war in the Islamic context. There are differing opinions on whether the book was actually commissioned by General Zia-ul-Haq, but that the work had his blessing is beyond doubt, for he wrote a glowing foreword to it and recommended it to civilians and soldiers alike. General Zia has written that, in his opinion, jihad is not the purview of the professional soldier alone, nor does it have applications solely in combat. Rather, he believed that the citizens of an Islamic state had an equally important role to play in jihad and that the book would go a long way towards making them understand the importance of their contribution.
Islam, as portrayed by Brig Malik, divides the world into two schools of thought – the Darus-Salam and the Darul-Harb. Darus-Salam consists of people who are submissive to God and are ready to comply with His word in reordering the world in accordance with the teachings contained in the holy book. Darul-Harb is said to comprise those who are defiant of Allah, or are intent on perpetuating the defiance of Allah and the Quran – i.e. the ‘unbelievers’ or infidels. There is no middle path in this respect, and it is maintained that the believer and the unbeliever will meet in conflict, time and again, and that such conflict can only culminate in the submission of the unbelievers to Allah. (This lack of a middle path – as advocated by some followers of Islam – is ironically reminiscent of President George W. Bush, who while drumming up support for the GWOT, repeatedly emphasised, “You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror.”)
The Quran, according to Brig Malik, instructs believers to subdue those defiant of the word of God, and promises to imbue them with the divine strength and ability to achieve their objectives. Malik emphasises that in Islam, “a war is fought for the cause of Allah. A Muslim’s cause of war is just, noble, righteous and humanitarian. A victory in Islam is a victory for the cause of Islam. So noble and humanitarian a cause cannot be allowed to be attained through inhuman and undignified ways. Humanitarianism, thus, lies at the very heart of the Islamic approach to war.” Thus, Malik’s convoluted thesis is a remarkable contradiction in terms.
Malik cautions the prospective jihadi from interpreting the word of God to suit his selfish motives, for the gaze of God is always on the followers, and should they let the blood of the innocent tarnish their victory, they invite divine displeasure. This is an admonition, to be sure, but clearly not a stumbling block against perpetrating terror attacks on innocent civilians. Malik goes on to mention that while certain limits to war are outlined, the Quran does not visualise a war being waged with ‘kid gloves’. In fact, Allah Bukhsh K Brohi, in the preface to the book, makes it clear that the “cancerous malformation” that is the unbeliever, must be removed from this world by “surgical means”, if required.
Speaking of personal interpretations of the Quran, Malik notes that the divine philosophy of war was not revealed immediately after the advent of Islam, nor was it given to its followers in one singular unit of teaching; rather, it came about over a period of time. While Malik makes this distinction with the intention to portray that the doctrine of war came about after much deliberation, unwittingly, he leaves room for the fact that the very (personal) interpretations that the Quran warns against, could very well have influenced the original doctrine of war itself. For example, Malik mentions that initially, Muslims were granted the “permission” to fight in self-defence, should the need arise. But, with the passage of time, they were “commanded” to do so, making jihad a religious compulsion and obligation.
One of the most crucial aspects of Malik’s work is the emphasis he lays on the preparation required before a military conflict begins. This is the aspect of jihad in which the non-military populace has an important role to play. The Quran calls for all believers to strike terror into the hearts of the unbelievers, because if one is able to destroy the enemy’s spiritual and mental strength, they will prove to be no match for the followers of Islam. If it so happens that this objective is not met in the preparatory stage, methods to strike terror should continually be utilised even during the actual fighting. The implications of this aspect of Islamic doctrine are far-reaching, because it envisions terror not merely as a means towards an end, but also as an end in itself. That is, when God chooses to impose his will upon his enemies, He chooses to do so by casting terror into their hearts. A perfect example of this tactic is the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the US – both were intended to strike terror into the hearts of the masses by attacking symbols held in high regard without the employment of a military force.
The conclusions which the author has drawn from Quranic theories, while dated and at times controversial, are accurate, and for the most part, conform to traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Every implementation of a Quranic war strategy is backed by historical case studies, most notably those of Prophet Mohammed’s war against the Pagans. Malik goes into great detail in describing the victory of the forces of Prophet Mohammed as a result of an all-encompassing, military and non-military strategy, over those of the Pagans, who were merely concerned with the total annihilation of Muslims.
While all the tactical formulations mentioned have their basis in accepted Western strategic theories and contexts, Malik doesn’t shy away from making light of Western military teachings. He finds Clausewitz’s theories inspiring, yet wanting, as according to the Quran, it is war which defines policy and its parameters, and not the other way around. He quotes Edward Meade Earle as saying, “War is not an act of God. It grows out of what people, statesmen and nations do or fail to do,” and refutes Earle’s reasoning with the idea that the very initiation of war is for the cause of God. It is, therefore, controlled and conditioned by His Word, from conception till culmination. The implication in this reasoning is that since the theory of war is derived from God, and not man, the death and destruction caused in its wake is divine, and thus, absolved from sin. In addition, since the discussion of war is based on revealed truth and examples, it is clearly more practical than theoretical. After all, what need does God have to theorise?
A particular aspect of the book, however, is more consistent with traditional Pakistani rather than Quranic rhetoric. Whenever Malik makes note of the kind of conduct in the course of war that is unacceptable in the Quranic perspective, he never fails to cite India as an example, whether it is a “false treaty” with Russia through which India “invaded and dismembered” Pakistan, or when it “detained” Pakistani POWs far longer than permissible by human rights standards.
The latter part of the book lapses into a more academic description of Islamic warfare in standard, acceptable categories such as planning and organisation and offers no unique insight. Malik concludes the work by restating his major point that the emphasis in Quranic warfare is on preparation, which implies instilling terror into the heart of the enemy. The intention is to weaken the enemy to such an extent that no military conflict is actually necessary. He, thus, makes it clear that terrorism, war and devastation, are all integral parts of Quranic military instruction.
His thesis, therefore, concludes that “Islam is the answer” while planning and preparing for conducting war. Of course, like most modern Islamists, he is a bit of a romantic, seeking to return to a time when Islam enjoyed its most successful campaigns and growth. In the bargain, he neglects the reality that if following Quranic military precepts and teachings were to have such a major impact, more than a thousand years of Islamic military history might have had more to show than the geo-political significance of Islam today.
Malik’s perspective throughout this book is rather insular and his style more editorial than academic. Yet, while his reach and audience in Pakistan can only be conjectured at, there is no doubt that his viewpoints on the Quranic concept of warfare and the role of terror in the same would resonate exceedingly well with modern extremists and radicals, and shades of it may even be found in the philosophies of terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda and others of the same ilk. Therefore, despite certain ambiguities and conceptual weaknesses, this work does merit intensive study, and should be valued for the insight it gives into the mind of the modern jihadi.
While older Pakistani army officers claim that Malik’s book does not carry much weight in their thinking, it distinctly reflects the Pakistan Army’s doctrine of waging irregular wars and proxy wars against its neighbours through asymmetric means. Clearly, the gist of Malik’s writing has been inalterably ingrained in the Pakistani military psyche. This is especially so when it is well known that the younger Pakistani officers commissioned during the Zia years have been deeply Islamised. Despite the fact that it is understood in India that the Quran does not justify terrorism, this book should be prescribed for reading by all Indian armed forces officers, diplomats and bureaucrats, as a tool for understanding the Pakistani military psyche.
(Views expressed in this Issue Brief are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
Gurmeet Kanwal
Director, CLAWS
E-Mail-kanwal.gurmeet@gmail.com, gurmeetkanwal@hotmail.com
&
Samarjit Ghosh
samarjit.ghosh@gmail.com
Eight years after the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the United States-led Global War on Terror, the world is still far from eliminating terrorism caused by radical extremists belonging to various Islamist factions. The epicentre of this scourge lies astride the Durand Line in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan and the territory ruled by the Taliqaeda in Afghanistan. While the military forces of the US and its coalition partners (NATO and ISAF) are arrayed against the Taliqaeda and have achieved limited success, precious little has been done to explore the role played by radical Islamic teachings in the Taliqaeda’s ongoing war.
It is not clear whether the Taliqaeda terrorists have been brainwashed by certain vested interests to act in an inhuman manner for the sake of waging a holy war against infidels, or whether they are simply following what they believe is laid down in the scriptures. Put another way, are these terrorists motivated singularly by ideals of a self-serving nature and giving vent to their private demons, or is there a more concrete foundation for the acts of horror that they indulge in? If that is so, are they interpreting the Quran to suit their own beliefs, or are they actually following a doctrine of war contained within the scriptures?
Standard analytical texts on the doctrine of war propagated by Prophet Mohammed are practically non-existent. The closest that a book comes to attempting an understanding and explaining the doctrine of war in Islam is The Quranic Concept of War, authored by Brigadier S K Malik of the Pakistan Army. Though it is not a new book, it plays a crucial role in explaining the ‘just war’ theory and war in the Islamic context. There are differing opinions on whether the book was actually commissioned by General Zia-ul-Haq, but that the work had his blessing is beyond doubt, for he wrote a glowing foreword to it and recommended it to civilians and soldiers alike. General Zia has written that, in his opinion, jihad is not the purview of the professional soldier alone, nor does it have applications solely in combat. Rather, he believed that the citizens of an Islamic state had an equally important role to play in jihad and that the book would go a long way towards making them understand the importance of their contribution.
Islam, as portrayed by Brig Malik, divides the world into two schools of thought – the Darus-Salam and the Darul-Harb. Darus-Salam consists of people who are submissive to God and are ready to comply with His word in reordering the world in accordance with the teachings contained in the holy book. Darul-Harb is said to comprise those who are defiant of Allah, or are intent on perpetuating the defiance of Allah and the Quran – i.e. the ‘unbelievers’ or infidels. There is no middle path in this respect, and it is maintained that the believer and the unbeliever will meet in conflict, time and again, and that such conflict can only culminate in the submission of the unbelievers to Allah. (This lack of a middle path – as advocated by some followers of Islam – is ironically reminiscent of President George W. Bush, who while drumming up support for the GWOT, repeatedly emphasised, “You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror.”)
The Quran, according to Brig Malik, instructs believers to subdue those defiant of the word of God, and promises to imbue them with the divine strength and ability to achieve their objectives. Malik emphasises that in Islam, “a war is fought for the cause of Allah. A Muslim’s cause of war is just, noble, righteous and humanitarian. A victory in Islam is a victory for the cause of Islam. So noble and humanitarian a cause cannot be allowed to be attained through inhuman and undignified ways. Humanitarianism, thus, lies at the very heart of the Islamic approach to war.” Thus, Malik’s convoluted thesis is a remarkable contradiction in terms.
Malik cautions the prospective jihadi from interpreting the word of God to suit his selfish motives, for the gaze of God is always on the followers, and should they let the blood of the innocent tarnish their victory, they invite divine displeasure. This is an admonition, to be sure, but clearly not a stumbling block against perpetrating terror attacks on innocent civilians. Malik goes on to mention that while certain limits to war are outlined, the Quran does not visualise a war being waged with ‘kid gloves’. In fact, Allah Bukhsh K Brohi, in the preface to the book, makes it clear that the “cancerous malformation” that is the unbeliever, must be removed from this world by “surgical means”, if required.
Speaking of personal interpretations of the Quran, Malik notes that the divine philosophy of war was not revealed immediately after the advent of Islam, nor was it given to its followers in one singular unit of teaching; rather, it came about over a period of time. While Malik makes this distinction with the intention to portray that the doctrine of war came about after much deliberation, unwittingly, he leaves room for the fact that the very (personal) interpretations that the Quran warns against, could very well have influenced the original doctrine of war itself. For example, Malik mentions that initially, Muslims were granted the “permission” to fight in self-defence, should the need arise. But, with the passage of time, they were “commanded” to do so, making jihad a religious compulsion and obligation.
One of the most crucial aspects of Malik’s work is the emphasis he lays on the preparation required before a military conflict begins. This is the aspect of jihad in which the non-military populace has an important role to play. The Quran calls for all believers to strike terror into the hearts of the unbelievers, because if one is able to destroy the enemy’s spiritual and mental strength, they will prove to be no match for the followers of Islam. If it so happens that this objective is not met in the preparatory stage, methods to strike terror should continually be utilised even during the actual fighting. The implications of this aspect of Islamic doctrine are far-reaching, because it envisions terror not merely as a means towards an end, but also as an end in itself. That is, when God chooses to impose his will upon his enemies, He chooses to do so by casting terror into their hearts. A perfect example of this tactic is the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the US – both were intended to strike terror into the hearts of the masses by attacking symbols held in high regard without the employment of a military force.
The conclusions which the author has drawn from Quranic theories, while dated and at times controversial, are accurate, and for the most part, conform to traditional Islamic jurisprudence. Every implementation of a Quranic war strategy is backed by historical case studies, most notably those of Prophet Mohammed’s war against the Pagans. Malik goes into great detail in describing the victory of the forces of Prophet Mohammed as a result of an all-encompassing, military and non-military strategy, over those of the Pagans, who were merely concerned with the total annihilation of Muslims.
While all the tactical formulations mentioned have their basis in accepted Western strategic theories and contexts, Malik doesn’t shy away from making light of Western military teachings. He finds Clausewitz’s theories inspiring, yet wanting, as according to the Quran, it is war which defines policy and its parameters, and not the other way around. He quotes Edward Meade Earle as saying, “War is not an act of God. It grows out of what people, statesmen and nations do or fail to do,” and refutes Earle’s reasoning with the idea that the very initiation of war is for the cause of God. It is, therefore, controlled and conditioned by His Word, from conception till culmination. The implication in this reasoning is that since the theory of war is derived from God, and not man, the death and destruction caused in its wake is divine, and thus, absolved from sin. In addition, since the discussion of war is based on revealed truth and examples, it is clearly more practical than theoretical. After all, what need does God have to theorise?
A particular aspect of the book, however, is more consistent with traditional Pakistani rather than Quranic rhetoric. Whenever Malik makes note of the kind of conduct in the course of war that is unacceptable in the Quranic perspective, he never fails to cite India as an example, whether it is a “false treaty” with Russia through which India “invaded and dismembered” Pakistan, or when it “detained” Pakistani POWs far longer than permissible by human rights standards.
The latter part of the book lapses into a more academic description of Islamic warfare in standard, acceptable categories such as planning and organisation and offers no unique insight. Malik concludes the work by restating his major point that the emphasis in Quranic warfare is on preparation, which implies instilling terror into the heart of the enemy. The intention is to weaken the enemy to such an extent that no military conflict is actually necessary. He, thus, makes it clear that terrorism, war and devastation, are all integral parts of Quranic military instruction.
His thesis, therefore, concludes that “Islam is the answer” while planning and preparing for conducting war. Of course, like most modern Islamists, he is a bit of a romantic, seeking to return to a time when Islam enjoyed its most successful campaigns and growth. In the bargain, he neglects the reality that if following Quranic military precepts and teachings were to have such a major impact, more than a thousand years of Islamic military history might have had more to show than the geo-political significance of Islam today.
Malik’s perspective throughout this book is rather insular and his style more editorial than academic. Yet, while his reach and audience in Pakistan can only be conjectured at, there is no doubt that his viewpoints on the Quranic concept of warfare and the role of terror in the same would resonate exceedingly well with modern extremists and radicals, and shades of it may even be found in the philosophies of terrorist organisations such as the Al Qaeda and others of the same ilk. Therefore, despite certain ambiguities and conceptual weaknesses, this work does merit intensive study, and should be valued for the insight it gives into the mind of the modern jihadi.
While older Pakistani army officers claim that Malik’s book does not carry much weight in their thinking, it distinctly reflects the Pakistan Army’s doctrine of waging irregular wars and proxy wars against its neighbours through asymmetric means. Clearly, the gist of Malik’s writing has been inalterably ingrained in the Pakistani military psyche. This is especially so when it is well known that the younger Pakistani officers commissioned during the Zia years have been deeply Islamised. Despite the fact that it is understood in India that the Quran does not justify terrorism, this book should be prescribed for reading by all Indian armed forces officers, diplomats and bureaucrats, as a tool for understanding the Pakistani military psyche.
(Views expressed in this Issue Brief are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies)
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